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ABSTRACT
The widespread expansion of online markets in the past decade poses several
questions for platforms, firms and customers alike. An important dimension to be
explored in this domain is the provision of information on e-commerce platforms -
given the increasing ease with which product pages can be customized to include
a vast variety of content, how do these pieces of information interact? Further,
what are the specific channels through which this information eventually influences
consumer decision-making? My dissertation is situated in this space, and aims to
look at how consumers respond to various “cues” that are being introduced by e-
commerce platforms which offer products or services that can be purchased online, and
how these cues might eventually influence decision-making. In my first dissertation
project, the cue I focus on is user generated content. More specifically, I study how
the introduction of the Q&A technology (which enables customers to ask product-
specific questions before purchase, and receive answers either from other customers
or the platform itself) affects the more widely established reviews and ratings feature
on e-commerce platforms. I find that the addition of Q&As leads to better matches
vii
between customers and products, higher customer satisfaction, and resultantly higher
ratings. My second project examines another cue that is common in online markets,
which is the advertised reference price. My goal in this project is to examine how
users react to a specific variant of such prices, namely the “Starting from...” price,
using data from a large scale field experiment conducted on Holidu.com. My results
indicate that raising “From” prices gives users a more accurate price estimate, but it
negatively impacts outbound clicks and other engagement metrics. Taken together,
the two projects aim to shed light on factors that influence consumer decision-making
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The widespread expansion of online markets in the past decade poses several ques-
tions for platforms, firms and customers alike. Most of these questions revolve around
the resolution of information asymmetries which are exacerbated in an online setting.
In other words, to facilitate transactions, online markets need to make design choices
that provide accurate information and build trust between buyers and sellers. My
dissertation research is situated in this space and looks at a specific aspect of the
information provision problem: given the increasing ease with which product pages
can be customised to include a vast variety of content, how do these pieces of infor-
mation interact? Further, what are the specific channels through which consumer
decision-making is influenced by this? To study the above, I choose two important
informational cues that most e-commerce platforms have adopted: (1) user generated
content (UGC) and (2) advertised reference prices (ARP). Particularly, I try to un-
derstand how consumers respond to these cues, and how this might eventually affect
the platform.
In chapter 2, I study how reputation systems (namely, user-generated reviews and
ratings) on an e-commerce platform might be affected by a relatively new tool: Q&A
technology. Q&As are also user generated – they allow customers to ask product-
specific questions before purchase and receive answers either from other customers or
the platform itself. I obtain data from a major UK-based e-commerce platform, and
exploit variation in the timing of Q&As posted for various products to estimate their
2
impact on subsequent ratings and review text. I find that Q&As lead to higher prod-
uct ratings by solving an important information problem relating to how consumers
match with products in an online setting. Products often receive low ratings not
because of vertical quality concerns but rather because of horizontal fit mismatches.
An analysis of review and Q&A text reveals complementary roles for these two cor-
pora: while reviews provide relevant information regarding the quality of a product
before purchase, Q&As are much more effective at addressing idiosyncratic concerns
about product fit that are specific to consumers. By alleviating such fit concerns, the
addition of Q&As leads to better matches between customers and products, higher
customer satisfaction, and result in higher ratings. Moreover, we build a text classifier
to distinguish fit vs quality related negative reviews and find that the rating increase
is driven by a reduction in reviews that highlight fit concerns.
In chapter 3, I aim to measure how consumers react when they are exposed to
advertised reference prices that are not directly related to be price they need to
pay. These prices are used widely across vacation rental platforms (which is the
setting I study), and displayed when consumers conduct a search without entering
dates. The particular ARP variant I consider is the ‘Starting from’ (floor) price,
which has not been empirically investigated in the literature so far. In partnership
with a large travel booking website (Holidu.com), I conduct two field experiments
that exogenously vary the displayed floor price across users. Doing so, I find that
users exposed to higher floor prices are less likely to engage with the platform - they
make fewer outbound clicks, conduct fewer searches and spend lesser time on the
website. They also tend to have a lower propensity to book and spend less on the
website, although these booking related measures are not statistically significant due
to sparsity. These effects occur despite higher floor prices providing users with a more
accurate price estimate on average. I draw from the price obfuscation and salience
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literature to justify these findings, and demonstrate that price salience (in the form
of more accurate or transparent prices in this context) can in fact adversely affect
consumer outcomes. Platforms thus need to carefully evaluate price display related
decisions to optimise engagement.
Finally, in chapter 4, I provide some examples of research problems and ongoing
projects that directly emerge from my dissertation work.
The primary tools I employ in my research are causal inference coupled with
applications of machine learning. The paradigm for my second chapter is a quasi-
experiment, whereas for the third it is a large scale randomised field experiment.
Taken together, this research aims to demonstrate the possible consequences of heuris-
tic cues that consumers are exposed to when they are shopping online, and provides
insight into how firms might use this knowledge for optimal information provision.
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Chapter 2
Interacting User Generated Content
Technologies: How Questions and
Answers Affect Consumer Reviews
This chapter studies the question and answer (Q&A) technology of electronic
commerce platforms, an increasingly common form of user-generated content that
allows consumers to publicly ask product-specific questions and receive responses,
either from the platform or from other customers. Using data from a major online
retailer, we show that Q&As complement consumer ratings and reviews: unlike re-
views, questions are primarily asked pre-purchase and focus on clarification of product
attributes rather than discussion of quality; answers convey fit-specific information
in a predominantly sentiment-free way. Based on these observations, we hypothesize
that Q&As mitigate product fit uncertainty, leading to better matches between prod-
ucts and consumers, and therefore improved product ratings. Indeed, when products
suffering from fit mismatch start receiving Q&As, their subsequent ratings improve
by approximately 0.1 to 0.5 stars and the fraction of negative reviews that discuss
fit-related issues declines. The extent of the rating increase due to Q&As is propor-
tional to the probability that purchasers will experience fit mismatch without Q&A.
These findings suggest that, by resolving product fit uncertainty in an e-commerce
setting, the addition of Q&As can be a viable way for retailers to improve ratings of
products that have incurred low ratings due to customer-product fit mismatch.
5
2.1 Introduction
Consumer reviews have been shown to influence purchase decisions in the context
of both products and services, and are widely adopted by brands and retailers (Cheva-
lier and Mayzlin, 2006; Zhu and Zhang, 2010; Luca, 2016). Recently, another form
of user-generated content, questions and answers (Q&As), has been gaining trac-
tion with online retailers and review platforms. Q&A technology, which is typically
implemented alongside reviews, enables consumers to ask specific questions about a
product and receive answers from another consumer, the brand, or the platform it-
self. Q&A technology is now widely adopted by retailers and has been embraced by
consumers.1 Despite this increased usage, little is known about how this technology
affects consumer decision making.
In this paper, our aim is to fill this gap and examine the impact of Q&As on
consumer decision making. Using data on consumer reviews and Q&As from a major
UK-based electronic commerce platform spanning a period of 5 years, we show that
Q&A technology resolves an important information problem and ultimately leads to
better purchase decisions. The information problem arises from two sources of un-
certainty that consumers face when trying to evaluate a product: quality uncertainty
and fit uncertainty. Quality is a product-level characteristic that consumers agree
upon, whereas fit captures idiosyncratic preferences that are specific to individual
consumers. Fit uncertainty is exacerbated in an online setting because consumers
cannot interact physically with a product prior to purchase.
We hypothesize that products often receive low ratings not because of quality con-
cerns but rather because of consumer-product mismatches owing to fit uncertainty,
possibly resulting from inadequate or wrong information on a retailer’s website, highly
individualized fit requirements on behalf of consumers, or intrinsic product complex-
1Appendix A shows examples of Q&As from various platforms. Amazon.com displays Q&As
prominently above consumer reviews on each product page.
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ity.2
To alleviate fit mismatch, online retailers have traditionally relied on consumer re-
views. We posit that Q&A technology can act as an effective complement to reviews,
and can help resolve any residual fit uncertainty that reviews might fail to address.
By comparing our Q&A and review corpora, we find substantive differences in both
how consumers use these information sources and their contents. We find that, un-
like reviews, Q&As primarily happen pre-purchase, focus on clarification of product
attributes rather than discussion of quality, and convey fit-specific information in a
relatively concise and sentiment-free way. By contrast, because review text does not
have a predefined structure that requires authors to comment on both quality and
fit issues, it can be difficult for individual consumers to deduce fine aspects of prod-
uct fit from this corpus. In these cases, Q&A technology can be a complement to
consumer reviews since it allows individual consumers to inquire or read about their
specific sources of uncertainty and receive answers before purchase. By addressing
specific concerns about product features that may not come up in reviews3, Q&As
can mitigate fit uncertainty before purchases happen. Thus, our main hypothesis
is that Q&A technology can help resolve fit uncertainty where it exists, leading to
greater consumer satisfaction post-purchase, which in turn results in higher product
evaluations in the form of increased ratings.
A challenge that we face in testing our main hypothesis is identifying products
that are more likely to suffer from fit mismatch. Because we do not directly observe
whether a negative review is posted due to quality or fit related issues, we construct
three different proxies for fit mismatch. Our first measure, motivated by the obser-
vation that mismatch causes low ratings, is the average rating of each product prior
2Please refer to Appendix A for some illustrative examples of reviews arising from poor quality
vs poor fit.
3For instance, “My studio flat door is 27 inches wide, would it come through the door?” or “Does
this work with Nikon L820 Bridge Camera?”
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to the arrival of its first Q&A. While this measure is straightforward to compute,
it is imperfect: some products might have low ratings due to quality issues rather
than fit mismatch. Our second measure addresses this concern by taking into account
the variance in ratings. High variance signals more heterogeneity in consumer pref-
erences for certain attributes of the product, and therefore a higher likelihood of fit
mismatch. Finally, our third measure takes into account the text content of negative
reviews. We begin by asking human coders to read and categorize a sample of nega-
tive reviews into one of three categories: poor quality, poor fit, or other miscellaneous
reasons (e.g., shipping concerns). We then use these human-labeled reviews to train
a classifier that detects fit concerns. We apply this classifier to all negative reviews in
our data to construct our third measure: the fraction of each product’s reviews that
discuss fit issues.
Using data from a major UK retailer, we estimate the effect of Q&As on sub-
sequent product ratings by exploiting variation in the timing of Q&As posted for
different products. We find that answering questions for products that suffer from fit
mismatch increases their subsequent ratings by roughly 0.1 stars. Moreover, we find
that the extent of this rating increase is proportional to the probability that purchasers
experience fit mismatch for that product prior to Q&A. To provide evidence around
our hypothesized mechanism—that Q&As lead to better matches between consumers
and products—we estimate the impact of Q&As on the probability of products re-
ceiving negative reviews mentioning fit-related issues. We find that the fraction of
negative reviews due to fit concerns declines following the arrival of Q&As, with the
extent of this decline again being proportional to the probability of fit mismatch prior
to Q&A.
To interpret these results causally, we need to assume that the timing of Q&As
is not correlated with time-varying unobservables that can also affect product rat-
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ings. This assumption could be violated in our setting. In particular, unobserved
marketing-related activities such as product page improvements, discounts, and pro-
motions could attract more consumers to specific products, leading to Q&As. To the
extent that these marketing activities are well-targeted, they could also lead to higher
ratings. We approach these threats to validity in several ways. First, we use an aux-
iliary dataset of browsing behavior to directly look for patterns suggestive of demand
shocks. We find no changes in the volume of reviews or product page impressions
around the time Q&As arrive. Next, we collect additional data from the Internet
Archive, which allows us to look at historical snapshots of the product pages in our
sample. Based on this data, we re-estimate our main specifications controlling for
historical prices, promotions and product description length, and we find no change
to our results. These robustness checks suggest that our results are not being driven
by unobserved marketing-related activities. Finally, we check whether there is an
influx of reviews whose contents address fit concerns coinciding with the arrival of
Q&As, which would confound our attribution. We test for changes in the composition
of review text around the time of the first answer, and find no evidence that review
contents change around the arrival of Q&As.
Overall, our findings suggest that, by resolving fit uncertainty in an e-commerce
setting, the implementation of Q&A technology can be a viable way for retailers to
improve product ratings, particularly for products that have suffered low ratings due
to consumer-product fit mismatch.
2.2 Related work
The impact of ratings and reviews on consumer behavior (most notably, purchase
decisions) has been well-documented in the literature. For example, in an online
experiment, it was shown that participants who consulted product recommendations
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selected these products twice as often as those who did not (Senecal and Nantel, 2004).
Online consumer ratings have also been found to significantly influence product sales
in the market for books (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006). Similarly, in the domain
of services, a one star increase in a restaurant’s Yelp rating led to 5-9% increase in
revenues (Luca, 2016). Although in this paper we do not directly look at purchases,
these studies show that an increase in average ratings is a positive and manageri-
ally relevant outcome, since it has been widely shown to correlate with downstream
conversion.
Other studies have looked more deeply into the impact of different characteristics
of reviews on sales. More helpful reviews and highlighted reviews have been found
to have a stronger impact on sales (Dhanasobhon et al., 2007). Further, the impact
of reviews on sales is stronger for less popular products and for customers who have
greater Internet experience (Zhu and Zhang, 2010). The text content of reviews
has also been established to be of importance above and beyond the corresponding
numerical rating (Archak et al., 2011).
In contrast to reviews, the role of user-generated Q&As in influencing conversion
or related buyer behavior in an e-commerce setting has not been looked at. Most
of the work in the domain of Q&As has focused on question-answering communities,
such as Quora and StackOverflow. Questions examined in this area include: how
reputation relates to response volume, question difficulty and answer quality on Stack
Overflow (Lappas et al., 2017), how to model the satisfaction of information seekers
in Q&A communities (Agichtein et al., 2009), what makes a “good” question in a
community setting (Ravi et al., 2014), and so on. In terms of the interplay between
Q&A-type communities and purchase behavior, it has been shown that engagement in
firm-operated online communities can lead customers to spend more on the firm (i.e,
accrue more “social dollars”), with this effect being strongest for posters of community
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content, and those with more social ties (Manchanda et al., 2015). In such a setting,
the source of economic benefit is seen as social rather than informational. Our work
highlights an alternative channel through which Q&A platforms might provide a
benefit to firms if they are integrated within an e-commerce framework, namely by
resolving fit mismatch and leading to higher consumer satisfaction. The most closely
related work to our paper, that also examines the overlap between Q&As and reviews
in an e-commerce setting, develops an algorithm to show how existing reviews can be
mined to answer questions on Amazon.com (McAuley and Yang, 2016). However, the
focus of this work is developing and comparing the algorithm to other existing text
mining tools, and does not investigate any causal questions that combine reviews and
Q&As.
Our “Conceptual framework” section highlights how consumers make use of re-
views and Q&As when both are present simultaneously on the product page. Closely
related to the constructs of horizontal and vertical differentiation (Tirole, 1988), we
posit that consumers are subject to two distinct varieties of uncertainty in an online
setting: product quality uncertainty and product fit uncertainty. Broadly construed,
product quality uncertainty is the consumer’s difficulty in evaluating product qual-
ity and predicting how a product will perform in the future (Dimoka et al., 2012).
Products may have inherent quality issues that are revealed only through prolonged
product usage - hence, reviews can be a valuable avenue through which quality un-
certainty is mitigated.
Product fit uncertainty, on the other hand, arises because buyers cannot easily
assess whether the product’s characteristics match their requirements or tastes (Hong
and Pavlou, 2014; Kwark et al., 2014). Fit uncertainty might thus lead to mismatched
purchases, and thereby attract low ratings even if the inherent product quality is
good. While different consumers may have the same level of quality uncertainty
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with a certain amount of information, their level of product fit uncertainty may vary
due to their particular needs and heterogeneous fit preferences. Hence, we posit
that attribute-based Q&A content can alleviate fit uncertainty more directly and
completely than review text alone.
Prior work has also explored various other avenues through which these uncer-
tainties can potentially be addressed, but without reference to Q&A technology. For
instance, using survey data from consumers, it was seen that participation in online
product forums reduces product fit uncertainty whereas the use of online media on
product pages reduces product quality uncertainty (Hong and Pavlou, 2014). Our
results relate to this work in the sense that we can think of Q&As as being similar
to product forums that reduce fit uncertainty (in both cases, customers can bring up
or read about specific concerns they have about a product). Fit uncertainty in an
e-commerce setting can also be reduced with virtual reality widgets. For instance,
in the context of apparel, it has been shown that offering virtual fitting rooms in-
creases conversion, basket sizes, average price of purchased products, and revisits
to the site, while reducing fulfillment costs arising from returns and home try-on
behavior (Gallino and Moreno, 2018).
In the general domain of product returns, the two types of uncertainty have also
been argued for: it has been shown that product fit uncertainty is mitigated by offline
inspection and visits to the store, whereas reviews can offer a strong quality signal,
thereby mitigating quality uncertainty, both of which can reduce return rates (Sahoo
et al., 2018). We posit that, apart from offline inspections and augmented reality apps
(e.g. virtual trials), Q&As can be an effective tool with which retailers can reduce fit
uncertainty.
In addition to using average ratings and review text to measure the probability
of inherent fit mismatch for a product, we also make use of rating variance. It has
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been shown that niche products which some consumers like but others dislike can give
rise to high variance (Sun, 2012). We would thus expect Q&As to facilitate better
informed purchases for such products.
Finally, our setting differs from one in which quality and fit are more intrinsically
linked and hard to disentangle (e.g. for books or movies). For instance, it has been
shown that reviews on Goodreads.com can influence the nature of product discovery
and thus shape consumer choices, by allowing consumers to find lesser known products
that match their taste, more so than simply identifying products of high quality. In
such settings, the role of Q&As would be more nuanced, since there are fewer objective
attributes, and open-ended reviews might be more helpful in terms of resolving fit
uncertainty (Bondi, 2019).
2.3 Conceptual framework
As summarized above, uncertainty in the context of e-commerce can be thought
to be the result of two information problems: quality uncertainty and fit uncertainty.
The industrial organization literature (Tirole, 1988) defines quality as a product-level
attribute that is commonly perceived by all consumers, whereas fit reflects aspects
of utility that are specific to individual consumers and can be highly idiosyncratic.
In modern electronic commerce platforms, a key mechanism for reducing quality un-
certainty is product reviews contributed by past purchasers. Product reviews can
also provide information about fit. Nevertheless, reviews are not as well-suited to
reducing fit uncertainty because they typically mix discussion of several aspects of a
consumer’s experience with a product (e.g. performance, features, reliability, dura-
bility) using language that tends to be subjective and sentiment-laden (Liu et al.,
2019). Moreover, the number of product attributes that relate to fit can be large
and vary across consumers. Individual consumers may care about different subsets
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of such attributes or may value the same attributes differently. For example, in the
context of a smartphone, suppose that a consumer cares a lot about compatibility
of the phone with an obscure hands-free protocol of an older vehicle. If no previous
buyer of that product was interested in that exact product attribute, it is unlikely
that any related information would be present, either in the product description or
in the available product reviews. Q&A technology would enable that consumer to
proactively ask a question about that, rather obscure, product feature and thus re-
solve her idiosyncratic fit uncertainty prior to purchase. In cases such as the above,
Q&As act as a complement to reviews by allowing consumers to decrease their fit
uncertainty prior to purchase. This in turn leads to consumers purchasing products
better suited to their needs, and thus to fewer post-purchase regrets among those who
choose to purchase.
The following hypotheses summarize the key predictions of our theory:
1. Q&As act as complements rather than substitutes for reviews since they are
better able to provide fit specific information in a sentiment-free way.
2. The addition of Q&A alongside reviews is expected to resolve pre-purchase fit
uncertainty. Resultantly, consumers are better matched to the products they
purchase, which is reflected in higher product ratings.
3. The effect of Q&As is expected to be stronger for products that have higher
residual fit uncertainty.
4. The addition of Q&As should result in a decline in negative reviews that arise
due to fit concerns.
In Section A.2, we also present a mathematical model that captures how the presence
of informative Q&A affects consumer decision making and product ratings in settings
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with consumer fit uncertainty. Our model backs the above framework by showing that,
if answers are reliably correct, Q&As increase ratings by eliminating fit mismatch.
Further, the positive effect of Q&A on product ratings is proportional to the product-
level probability that purchasers will experience fit mismatch without Q&A, which,
in turn, is proportional to the amount of fit-related negative reviews without Q&A.
2.4 Data and descriptives
We obtain data from Bazaarvoice via the Wharton Consumer Analytics Initia-
tive4. Bazaarvoice provides software that enables businesses to collect and display
reviews and Q&As on their websites. Our data comes from a UK-based big-box
retailer (similar to Amazon.com) that uses Bazaarvoice software. The data covers
two product categories of consumer durables (Technology and Home & Garden) and
includes all reviews and Q&As posted between 2009 and 2015. The two product
categories are further subdivided into 755 subcategories such as Bedroom Furniture
and Video Games. It is worth noting that for durables (unlike hotels/restaurants),
it is less likely for firms to improve product quality over a short period of time, thus
mitigating concerns of product quality increases in response to reviews.
Overall, our data contains 37,853 unique product identifiers.5 Out of these, 19,961
products do not have any user generated content (possibly because they were newly
introduced products at the time of data collection) and thus cannot be considered
for our analyses. Out of the remaining 17,892 products, 13,354 have at least one
Q&A, 13,104 have at least one review, and 8,428 have both reviews and Q&As. Since
4https://wcai.wharton.upenn.edu/
5Some of these product identifiers refer to minor variations of the same underlying product, such
as a white iPad and a black iPad, and share the same Q&As but have different reviews. We treat
variations as independent products, because the ability of Q&A to alleviate fit uncertainty might
differ across product variations, and aggregating them would lead us to underestimate the treatment
effect of interest. Additionally, allowing for a product-level rather than a product-group level fixed
effect in our estimation lends more flexibility to the model.
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we want to study the impact of Q&As on product ratings, our analyses will focus
on products that (1) have both reviews and Q&As and (2) have received at least
one review before the first question was asked. This leaves us with 5,077 products,
345,168 reviews and 48,687 Q&A pairs. Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for all
products in our estimation.
In addition to the above, we make use of click-stream data collected over a two
month period in 2015 (February and March) to supplement our main analyses. This
data consists of the browsing behavior of customers (i.e. which specific product pages
were clicked on). Within this dataset, we look at products that received their first
answer within the two month observation period.
We also collect data from the Internet Archive to conduct a series of robustness
checks. These supplementary data sets are described in detail in the “Robustness
checks” section.
2.4.1 Q&A, reviews, and fit uncertainty
The hypotheses we develop in this paper relate to the ability of Q&As to resolve
fit uncertainty. In this section, we show that the Q&A corpus has a number of
characteristics that make it particularly well-suited to conveying information about
fit to consumers. We also compare Q&As to consumer reviews, and show that the
two corpora differ in important ways that make Q&As better suited to resolving fit
uncertainty.
We begin by examining the adoption of the Q&A technology, since the ability
of Q&As to resolve fit uncertainty depends on the rate at which the feature is used
by consumers. Figure 2·1 provides some descriptive patterns of Q&A dynamics. In
Figure 2·1a and Figure 2·1b, we find evidence of increased usage of Q&As over time,
mirroring the increasing adoption of reviews. In Figure 2·1c, we show that over time,
questions have been getting answered faster: the average number of days it takes for
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a posted question to be answered has gone down from 17 days in 2011 to 4 days in
2015, suggesting increasing engagement with the feature. Finally, in Figure 2·1d, we
plot the distribution of answers per question. In our data, all questions are answered,
and approximately 70% of questions have a single answer. We also find that close
to 80% of answers to questions come from the platform itself, and not from other
customers.6
In Table 2.2, we display the top product categories in terms of questions per
product. We find that categories related to electronics and their accessories receive
the most questions per product. Since these products are complex and typically
associated with customer concerns about usability and compatibility, we would indeed
expect a larger number of questions related to them.
Next, we report some descriptive evidence consistent with our hypothesis that
Q&As mostly contain pre-purchase, fit-specific information, and do so in a less sentiment-
laden fashion than reviews. First, to get at the pre-purchase nature of Q&As, we
randomly sampled 2,400 questions. A set of 240 coders were then asked to classify a
randomly chosen set of 10 questions each. We asked coders whether the question was
most likely asked before or after purchase.7 We then computed (at the coder level) the
fraction of responses that were in favor of questions being before purchase. We find
that 83% of questions are posted pre-purchase. This is in stark contrast with reviews,
which occur almost always (and for some platforms, exclusively) post-purchase.
To better understand content differences between reviews and Q&As, we perform
a comparative sentiment analysis of the two corpora. We begin with a parts-of-speech
classification of all reviews and Q&As. We find that reviews have a significantly higher
6This may not be the norm across different e-commerce platforms. Anecdotally, Amazon.com
seems to attract more customer answers. Future work could examine potential differences in the
effects of Q&As in environments dominated by customer vs. platform answers.
7For example, a pre-purchase question would be: “Is this keyboard compatible with MAC OS X
Yosemite?”, whereas a post-purchase question would be: “My keyboard came with no instructions
and the piece that raises the base already attached. How do I take it off?”
17
proportion of adjectives and adverbs (20%) compared to Q&As (9%). Adjectives and
adverbs are known to be important components of sentiment analysis (Benamara
et al., 2007). We also perform a sentiment analysis task on Mechanical Turk by
asking coders to rate the sentiment content of 2,000 Q&A pairs (each pair is rated by
two independent coders, with a third coder being assigned to break any ties), and find
that 90% of them are rated as “neutral”. This leads us to believe that, while reviews
are a more holistic expression of preferences, Q&As embody fit-specific information
in a relatively sentiment-free way.
Finally, we examine the text of Q&As and reviews to gather additional evidence
that Q&As are predominantly used for alleviating specific concerns related to product
fit. To do this, we use a Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) topic model (Blei et al.,
2003).8 We train our LDA model on the entire body of reviews and Q&As and
obtain 20 topics in each case. Consistent with our sentiment analysis above, the
topics obtained for Q&As contain more references to fit-related attributes (such as
dimensions, compatibility) than the topics obtained for reviews, which mostly contain
information about product quality, or express sentiment in general. The top three
topics (and associated highest-probability words) obtained in both cases are provided
in Table 2.3.
2.5 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we begin by motivating our main estimating equation, and then
discuss our identification strategy for measuring the causal impact of Q&As on con-
sumer reviews. Our main hypothesis, articulated in the “Conceptual framework”
section, is that Q&As can provide fit-specific information that allows better-matched
8We also build a Naive Bayes classifier that discriminates between Q&A and review text and
find very similar qualitative conclusions: some of the top words that discriminate review content are
“looks”, “value”, “money” and“great”, whereas that for Q&As are “helps”, “hope”, “confirm” and
“using”. More details on this analysis are available upon request.
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purchases, resulting in higher post-purchase utility and thus ratings. In our data, we
observe individual reviews i left by purchasers of each product j, hence in what fol-
lows, we model purchasers rather than all consumers. This distinction is important
since our theory does not predict that the same consumer i receives higher utility
post-Q&A. Rather, the ith purchaser who selects into buying and rating product j in
the presence of Q&A is happier than the counterfactual ith purchaser who buys and
rates the product without Q&A and suffers mismatch.
We assume that products are both vertically and horizontally differentiated. Thus,
each purchaser i derives post-purchase utility from two separate components of prod-
uct j: vertical quality (ηj), which is product specific and common to all purchasers,
and horizontal fit (µij), which captures the degree to which j is a good match for
purchaser i’s preference. Thus, ex-post utility takes the form:
Uij = ηj +µij (2.1)
To capture the potential impact of Q&As, we model the horizontal component of
post-purchase utility as:
µij = βj ·POSTij + ǫij , (2.2)
where POSTij is an indicator set to one following each product’s first answered ques-
tion and zero otherwise, and ǫij captures unobserved idiosyncratic factors that affect
utility. To account for the fact that some products may suffer from fit mismatch more
than others, we allow the effect of Q&As to be product-specific:
βj = β0 +β1 ·mj , (2.3)
where mj captures the degree of fit mismatch faced by purchasers of product j.
Here, β0 is an intercept term capturing the effect of Q&As on products facing no
fit mismatch, and β1 is a slope term capturing the effect of Q&As as the degree of
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mismatch mj increases.
Substituting Equation 2.3 into the utility function in Equation 2.1, we derive the
following expression for the average utility obtained by purchasers of product j:
Uij = ηj +β0 ·POSTij +β1 · (mj ·POSTij)+ ǫij . (2.4)
If β1 is positive, we can infer that on average, purchaser i is better matched with
product j and therefore derives higher utility in the presence of Q&As. Further, the
higher the degree of fit mismatch mj , the greater the increase in utility. Under the as-
sumption that ratings rij are an increasing function of utility, we modify Equation 2.4
above to arrive at the following estimating equation:
rij = ηj + δt(ij) +β0 ·POSTij +β1 · (mj ·POSTij)+X
′
ij ·β2 + ǫij . (2.5)
Compared to the utility function above, this equation introduces additional controls,
some of which depend on calendar time. We use the subscript t(ij) to denote the year-
month of review i for product j. Specifically, we model rating i left for product j as a
function of product fixed effects ηj , time fixed effects δt(ij), time-varying observables
Xij , the POSTij indicator, the fit mismatch term mj , and unobservables ǫij . In all
specifications we estimate, we cluster standard errors at the product level (Donald
and Lang, 2007).
The coefficient of interest, β1, has a causal interpretation under the assumption
that the timing of each product’s first answer is as good as random. This assumption
will be violated if increases in ratings and the propensity to answer questions are
jointly driven by an unobserved process. In the “Robustness checks” section, we
discuss and mitigate specific threats to this assumption.
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2.5.1 Measuring fit mismatch
Our theoretical framework predicts that the effect of Q&A on product ratings
is proportional to the degree of fit mismatch (mj) that purchasers will experience
without Q&A. However, the degree of fit mismatch inherent in any product’s past
purchases is not directly observable, since we do not know which negative reviews
arise due to poor quality, fit mismatch, or other reasons. We approach this problem
by constructing three proxies for the presence of fit mismatch prior to Q&A, which
we describe below.
Low average ratings Products with a high pre-Q&A probability of fit mismatch
will be purchased by many consumers for whom the product is a poor fit. In turn,
these consumers will leave negative reviews for these products, leading to low average
ratings. Hence, a simple heuristic for identifying products that suffer from bad fit
is to focus on products with low average ratings prior to treatment (i.e. before the
arrival of the first answer). We use an average rating of 4 out of 5 as the threshold
that separates these products that may suffer from fit mismatch from those that
don’t. Later, we also show that our results are robust to different thresholds. The
main concern with this measure is that fit mismatch is not the only source of negative
reviews. Thus, by selecting products that have low average ratings prior to receiving
Q&As, we may also incorrectly include products that do not suffer from fit mismatch
(for example, low quality products). These false positives may attenuate the Average
Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) we estimate.
High rating variance Our second measure looks at products that have a high
rating variance (Sun, 2012). We can think of such products as suffering from fit
mismatch since they have attributes that are asymmetrically preferred by consumers
(some like them and find them to be a good fit, others don’t). We label products
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whose rating variance is greater than 1 (the median) as suffering from mismatch.
This measure also runs the risk of attenuation bias, albeit in a different sense: for
products that have both high variance and high average ratings, bad fit might not be
a dominant concern, and therefore Q&As might have less of an impact.
Thus, both the low ratings and high variance measures can misclassify products
as suffering from poor fit when they do not. For example, when both the mean and
variance of ratings are low, the most likely cause is poor quality rather than poor
fit. Based on this observation, we also estimate specifications that combine these two
proxies to identify products suffering from poor fit. Our expectation is that Q&As
will be particularly helpful for low-rated high variance products.
Review text Our final measure looks at review text to identify products suffering
from fit mismatch. To construct this measure, we build a text classifier that can
distinguish negative reviews that arise due to poor fit. Using the classifier, we label
each negative review as fit-related or not. Finally, we construct a continuous variable
for fit mismatch for each product as the fraction of negative fit related reviews prior
to each product’s first answer.
To build the classifier, we first construct a training set by asking two coders
(on Amazon Mechanical Turk) to select most the likely cause of 3,300 randomly
chosen negative (1-, 2-, and 3-star) reviews.9 We indicate three categories into which
reviews are to be classified: poor fit, poor quality, or other miscellaneous reasons
(such as issues with the store or shipping). Appendix A shows the survey seen by
the coders. Any disagreements are resolved by a third coder. The coders classified
28% of negative reviews as having resulted primarily from poor fit and 67% primarily
from poor quality. Since the third category accounted for a small fraction of the
9Refer to Appendix A for some illustrative examples of reviews arising from poor quality vs poor
fit.
22
reviews (< 5%), relating mostly to in-store experiences and returns, we ignore it in
our subsequent analysis.
We use these manually labelled reviews to train a C-Support Vector Machine (C-
SVM) classifier (Cortes and Vapnik, 1995). To perform the classification task, we
remove common stopwords, and then tokenize and stem the text of each negative
review into a bag-of-words representation, thus obtaining word frequencies for each
negative review. We use these word frequencies as predictors to train a classifier that
predicts whether a negative review arises primarily from poor fit or poor quality.10
We train our classifier on an 80% random sample of our labelled data, holding
out the remaining 20% to evaluate the classifier’s performance. The C-SVM classi-
fier has one tunable parameter, C, which intuitively calibrates the trade off between
classification accuracy and having a larger-margin separating hyperplane. We select
a value for C using 5-fold grid search cross-validation. We evaluate the out-of-sample
performance of our classifier using the commonly employed ROC-AUC (receiver op-
erating characteristic area under the curve) metric. ROC-AUC ranges from 0 to 1
and it is a ranking metric. Intuitively, a ROC-AUC value of p implies a p probability
of correctly predicting which of two reviews belonging to different classes (poor fit
and poor quality) belongs to the poor fit class. Our classifier achieves a ROC-AUC
of 0.82.11
In addition to assessing the out-of-sample predictive power of our classifier, we
also check whether our classifier makes qualitatively meaningful predictions about fit
mismatch. We do so in three ways. First, in Table 2.4 we present the top-5 reviews
with the highest predicted probability of belonging to each of the two classes (fit
vs. quality issues). While reviews with a high predictive probability of being about
10We also considered using bigrams as predictors, but we did not see significant improvement in
out-of-sample predictive power.
11We also replicate our main analyses with a Naive Bayes classifier, which achieves an ROC-AUC
of 0.79. These results are available upon request.
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quality issues are explicit in mentioning poor product performance, reviews identified
as having fit issues reflect customer-specific requirements that the product failed to
fulfill, despite not inherently being of an inferior quality.
Second, we order all product categories in our dataset by the fraction of negative
reviews that arise due to fit issues. We present these results in Figure 2·2. Intuitively,
we would expect that categories for which a higher fraction of negative reviews are
about fit would tend to be those for which it is harder for consumers to gauge whether
the product is right for them. Indeed, we find that sofas (for which look and feel
might be hard to gauge), electronic devices (which may involve compatibility issues)
or accessories of some kind (which are meant to supplement a diverse set of existing
items) tend to have more negative fit reviews. On the other hand, products where
the customer’s domain knowledge dictates their purchase (such as DIY and power
tools) have fewer fit concerns according to our classifier.
Third, we examine the top 20 words that are most predictive of fit vs. quality
issues. To do so, we use layer-wise relevance propagation (LRP), a method originally
developed to interpret the results of deep neural nets (Bach et al., 2015). LRP
produces a score for each word and class (poor fit, and poor quality). High scores
are assigned to words that are good at discriminating reviews belonging to each
class. For linear SVM’s, the LRP score of each word-class combination is computed
as the sum of the products of the word loading and the tf-idf score of the word
in each of the reviews belonging to that class. We present the top-ranking words
by LRP score for each of the the classes in Table 2.5. We find, as expected, that
words which are a measure of objective quality (work, poor, cheap, broke) tend to
be more predictive of negative quality reviews, whereas words that indicate more
person-specific, idiosyncratic attributes (look, need, design, however) are predictive
of negative fit reviews.
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Overall, these results suggest that our text classifier can discriminate between
reviews that bring up fit-related concerns and those that do not.
2.5.2 Mean reversion and measurement error
A final empirical challenge arises due to the fact that we construct proxies for fit
mismatch as a function of past ratings, or, quantities correlated with past ratings (e.g.,
review text). This leads to two problems, which arise even if we assume treatment
is strictly exogenous, i.e., E[POSTij · ǫij ] = 0. Here, we discuss these two problems
under the assumption of treatment exogeneity; we discuss violations to treatment
exogeneity separately in Robustness checks.
The first problem arises from applying a within transformation to Equation 2.5
to eliminate product fixed-effects ηj . The transformation mechanically introduces
correlation between the demeaned residual and the demeaned version of mj ·POSTij ,
violating strict exogeneity and biasing OLS estimates of β1. (To see this, note that
demeaning mj · POSTij and ǫij introduces the mean error term in both quantities.)
Although this type of bias is more commonly seen in models that explicitly incorporate
a lagged outcome as a control (Nickell, 1981), it also arises in our setting because mj
is a function of lagged outcomes.
The second problem arises due to measurement error in the fit mismatch measure
mj . Recall that we do not observe mj directly, instead relying on noisy measures m̃j =
mj +vj (where m̃j in our case could be mean ratings or rating variance), and vj reflects
unobserved factors uncorrelated with mj that enter these proxies. For instance, some
products may randomly experience transient shipping delays—a random shock to
vj—prior to their first Q&A leading to excess negative ratings. This could decrease
the products’ mean ratings and increase rating variance, which we use as proxies for
fit mismatch, for reasons unrelated to fit mismatch. Subsequent ratings for these
products will likely revert back to their mean levels (e.g., once shipping delays are
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resolved) regardless of any direct Q&A effect.
Rewriting our main estimating equation to reflect the use of proxies for fit uncer-
tainty m̃j , we have:
rij = ηj + δt(ij) +β0 ·POSTij +β1 · (mj ·POSTij)+X
′
ij ·β2 + ǫij (2.6)
= ηj + δt(ij) +β0 ·POSTij +β1 · ((m̃j −vj) ·POSTij)+X
′
ij ·β2 + ǫij
= ηj + δt(ij) +β0 ·POSTij +β1 · (m̃j ·POSTij)+X
′
ij ·β2 + ǫ̃ij ,
where
ǫ̃ij = −β1 · (vj ·POSTij)+ ǫij . (2.7)
Note that Cov(m̃j ·POSTij , ǫ̃ij) 6= 0, since both quantities depend on the unobservable
vj . This results in bias when Equation 2.6 is estimated by OLS.
We adopt a standard solution (Griliches and Hausman, 1986) to this classical
measurement error problem, relying on a second noisy measure of our proxy, which
we use as instrument. (Other papers that have used a similar empirical strategy in
marketing include Narayanan and Nair (2013) - it has also seen widespread use in
economics, e.g., Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008), and Gupta (2021).) Specifically,
we divide the pre-Q&A period for each product into two smaller samples: a hold-out
period, which includes all reviews up to 200 days prior to the first answer, and a
shorter pre-treatment period that includes all reviews starting at 200 days prior to
the first answer and ending at the time of the first answer.12. We then use these two
samples to construct the two proxies m̃hold-outj and m̃
pre
j , where the former quantity
can be thought of as a lag of the latter. Finally, we use m̃hold-outj to construct instru-
ments for the endogenous variable m̃prej ·POSTij . The holdout sample is subsequently
12In a robustness check, we change the definition of our hold-out sample to make it more flexible:
out of all pre-Q&A observations, we select the most recent 50% to form the pre-treatment sample,
and the rest to form the hold-out sample. We report these estimates, which are similar to our main
results in Appendix A
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excluded from estimation. Our main estimating equation and the corresponding first
stage are given by:
rij = ηj + δt(ij) +β0 ·POSTij +β1 · (
̂m̃prej ·POSTij)+X
′
ij ·β2 + ǫ̃ij ,
(2.8)




ij ·γ2 + ũij .
(2.9)
where ǫ̃ij = −β1 · (v
pre
j ·POSTij)+ ǫij and ũij = −γ1 · (v
hold-out
j ·POSTij)+uij . To see
why this strategy works, notice that:
m̃hold-outj = mj +v
hold-out
j , (2.10)
m̃prej = mj +v
pre
j . (2.11)
The instrument m̃hold-outj · POSTij is valid under two conditions. First, it has to be
relevant and have a strong first stage, which we can verify. Second, it has to satisfy
the exclusion restriction E[(m̃hold-outj · POSTij)ǫ̃ij ] = 0. This condition will be met
as long as the two measurement errors are not correlated, i.e., E[vhold-outj · v
pre
j ] = 0
(recall that we are assuming ǫij is otherwise exogenous).
Intuitively, and continuing our prior example, we are assuming that products that
experienced random shipping delays (and consequently excess negative ratings) in the
pre-treatment period were not more likely to also experience such shocks in the hold-
out period. Thus, by instrumenting with hold-out ratings we use the signal embedded
in hold-out measures of fit mismatch (mj) to get rid of the noise in pre-treatment
measures of fit mismatch (vprej ), the latter being the source of bias when we estimate
Equation 2.6 by OLS.
While we cannot directly test the exclusion restriction, we check whether ratings,
which we use to construct proxies for fit mismatch, are serially correlated conditional
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on observables. To do so, we conduct an autocorrelation test proposed by Arellano
and Bond (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Roodman, 2009), and find that autocorrelation
in levels vanishes beyond the first lag. Specifically, a rating may be serially correlated
with the rating directly preceding it, but this serial correlation decays fast and is not
statistically significant for the second lag and beyond. This provides us with some
confidence that functions of ratings that are far apart in time (such as vhold-outj and
vprej ) are not correlated.
Using BLUP to construct instruments As we discussed above, the proxies we
use for fit mismatch are measured with error. Beyond causing issues with identifica-
tion, measurement error means that the instrument m̃hold-outj ·POSTij may be a poor
predictor of m̃prej ·POSTij for products with few reviews in the hold-out period. Here
we explain how we obtain more precise measurements of our fit mismatch measures.
To obtain a stronger instrument we use a shrinkage estimator for m̃hold-outj , where
we shrink the estimates of m̃hold-outj for products with few reviews towards the pop-
ulation mean (Robinson, 1991). Specifically, for each product we estimate the best
linear unbiased predictor (BLUP) of its mean rating in the hold-out sample using
a mixed effects model with a random intercept mj for each product j, and a fixed
intercept µ:
m̃hold-outj = µ+mj + ej
We apply this shrinkage estimator to the average rating and fraction of fit-related
negative reviews instruments. Estimating the above equation, we obtain a BLUP of
the mean rating and the mean fraction of fit related negative reviews in the hold-out
sample for each product, which we use to construct our final instruments.13
13Results remain qualitatively unchanged even without employing the shrinkage estimator. How-
ever, they are slightly attenuated due to higher measurement error in mj for products with fewer
reviews. These results are available upon request.
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2.6 Results
Now, we turn to estimating the effect of Q&A arrival on ratings using each of the
three fit mismatch measures that we described above.
2.6.1 Low pre-Q&A ratings
Our first measure is low pre-treatment average ratings. Hence, we estimate Equa-
tion 2.8 with m̃prej being an indicator for products with low average pre-treatment
ratings (≤ 4), and m̃hold-outj being the average rating of the product in the hold-out
period. In addition to product and time fixed effects, we also control for the rank of
each review (as recommended for example by Godes and Silva (2012)).
We present our results in Table 2.6. Column 1, which presents our OLS estimates,
serves as the baseline and includes all products and all reviews in the estimation
sample. We find a positive and significant increase in ratings of 0.24 for products
with a low pre-treatment mean. We also find a statistically significant decrease of
0.045 stars for products that have a high pre-treatment mean. As discussed in the
“Mean reversion and measurement error” subsection, some products may have high
or low pre-treatment ratings by pure chance rather than as a consequence of poor fit.
We would expect the ratings of these product to mean revert regardless of Q&As,
which would inflate our estimates. In column 2, we re-estimate the OLS model by
excluding the hold-out sample. Now, we see that both effects decrease in magnitude,
but we still observe a small dip for products without fit uncertainty. Next, we move
on to the IV specification. Column 3 reports the first stage of Equation 2.8. We see
that average ratings computed based on the hold-out sample using BLUP are strong
predictors of the pre-treatment average rating. Column 4 reports our preferred IV
estimate: we find a positive and significant increase of 0.12 for low-rated products,
and see no corresponding decrease for high-rated products. Finally, in column 5, to
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capture treatment heterogeneity, we estimate a less parsimonious but more flexible
specification where we interact the POSTij variable with a full set of dummies for mj
being in different unit intervals (hence we do not include the main effect for POSTij).
We instrument each of these variables with the corresponding lagged version from the
hold-out sample. We find substantial heterogeneity: the higher the fit mismatch, the
larger a product’s post-treatment increase in ratings.
To put the magnitude of our effect—approximately 0.1 stars on average—in con-
text, we compare it against the standard deviation of average ratings, which, for
products with at least 5 reviews, is also roughly equal to 0.1 stars. The size of the
effect we estimate is comparable to that of similar interventions such as the adoption
of management responses (Proserpio and Zervas, 2017).
2.6.2 High pre-Q&A variance
Our second measure of fit mismatch is high rating variance prior to treatment. We
estimate Equation 2.8 with m̃prej being an indicator for products with pre-treatment
variance ≥ 1 (the median value) and m̃hold-outj being the rating variance in the hold-
out period. We report our results in Table 2.7 for the full sample OLS (column 1),
OLS excluding hold-out data (column 2) and IV (columns 3 and 4). In all cases, we
find a positive and significant increase in ratings for high variance products following
treatment. Similar to the previous case, a small decrease is observed for products
with low variance, but this effect is very close to zero once we instrument for mean
reversion.
As described in the subsection “Measuring fit mismatch”, we also estimate speci-
fications that interact the low ratings and high variance proxies to better identify the
set of products whose ratings have suffered due to fit-related concerns. This speci-
fication contains the full interaction between the rating and variance proxies result-
ing in four groups of products based on their pre-treatment ratings: low rating/low
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variance, high rating/low variance, low rating/high variance, and high rating/high
variance. We instrument each of these dummies with its hold-out equivalent. Given
our theory, we expect low rating/high variance products to be primarily impacted by
Q&As. We present our results in Table 2.8. Among the four groups of products, we
see a statistically significant increase in ratings following Q&A arrival only for the
low rating/high variance group, as expected. It is worth noting that we do not see a
significant effect for high rated/high variance products. As previously mentioned, fit
mismatch might not be the dominant concern for this group of products, since they
are already high-rated.
2.6.3 High proportion of pre-Q&A fit-related negative reviews
Our final measure uses review text to detect pre-Q&A concerns about fit that
might exist for a product. As a measure of the probability of fit mismatch, we com-
pute the fraction of all reviews that are negative and fit-related prior to the arrival of
the first question, based on the classifier described in “Measuring fit mismatch”. We
estimate Equation 2.8 with m̃prej being the fraction of pre-treatment fit related nega-
tive reviews and m̃hold-outj being the fraction of fit related negative reviews constructed
in the hold-out sample estimated using a logistic BLUP. We present our results in
Table 2.9. The effect sizes for each specification mirror those found previously, thus
indicating that the extent of rating increase is proportional to the fraction of fit re-
lated negative reviews. To illustrate how the effect sizes can be interpreted, consider
the estimate in column 4: for a product with 10% of pre-treatment reviews expressing
fit concerns, we estimate a subsequent increase in ratings of 1.135×0.1 = 0.11 stars.
2.6.4 Mechanism: fit mismatch reduction
We now turn to examining a hypothesized mechanism for our effect, namely that
Q&As lead to higher ratings by promoting better matches between consumers and
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products. To do so, we estimate the same specification as Equation 2.5, but with the
dependent variable being an indicator for fit-related negative reviews (based on the
classifier described in “Measuring fit mismatch”). We code all non-fit-related negative
reviews and all positive reviews (4 and 5 stars) as 0. To match the definition of our
dependent variable we use the text-based measure for fit mismatch (we obtain similar
results for our two other measures, low ratings and high variance).
As before, we present results for both OLS and IV specifications in Table 2.10,
and include a control for review rank. We find a negative and significant effect for the
impact of Q&As on the probability of receiving a negative fit-related review for each of
our specifications, indicating that the fraction of fit-related reviews declines following
the arrival of the first answer, in proportion to the degree of fit mismatch prior to
Q&A. Focusing on our preferred IV specification in column 4, we can interpret our
estimates as follows: if 10% of all pre-treatment reviews are due to fit uncertainty,
the product would experience a subsequent decline in the probability of receiving a
negative fit-related review of -0.19 times 0.1, i.e. 1.9%. This effect is relatively small
due to the fact that the probability of receiving a negative review is low to begin
with: in our data, only 15% of all reviews are negative (1-, 2-, and 3-stars.) However,
conditional on receiving a negative review post-Q&A, the probability that this review
is fit-related decreases by 10015 ×1.9 = 12.6%.
Here we have shown that Q&As lead to fewer negative reviews that contain fit-
related concerns. Our hypothesized theory for this reduction is that Q&As change the
mix of consumers who purchase a product, i.e. Q&As affect selection into purchasing
a product by helping consumers discover whether a product is a good match for
them. However, Q&As might also affect who decides to leave a review. For instance,
some consumers may make mismatched purchases because they neglected to read
Q&As addressing their fit concerns. These consumers may later avoid leaving negative
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reviews if they realize that the poor purchase was their own mistake. However, we
believe that this is unlikely to be the prevalent mechanism for two reasons. First,
it assumes that consumers who did not read Q&As when they were researching a
product, decided to read them prior to leaving a review. While this is possible, we
think it is unlikely. Second, if Q&As deter people from leaving a review, we might
expect to see a reduction in the volume of reviews post Q&A arrival. However, this
is not what we find (see Table 2.11.)
Robustness checks
Our results above indicate that answering a question leads to an increase in sub-
sequent ratings for products that have suffered the consequences of fit mismatch.
Moreover, we show that this increase is driven by fewer fit-related negative reviews
post-Q&A. The primary threat to these findings is an unobserved time-varying con-
founder that drives both the arrival of Q&As and a subsequent increase in ratings, at
any time in the post period, for products that suffer from mismatch. In this section,
we investigate three such plausible confounders.
The first confounder we consider is promotions and discounts. Both increased
advertising and reduced prices can increase demand for a product, resulting in more
questions being asked and more reviews being submitted. The ratings associated
with these new reviews may be higher than the product’s current average rating due
to lower prices, or due to a well-targeted advertising campaign that drives purchases
from consumers who are likely to enjoy the product.
Next, we consider improvements to the product page. In response to a question
being asked, the platform may update a product’s description, which could alleviate
fit uncertainty and thus increase ratings. In this scenario, while Q&A spurs the
improvement of the product page, it is not the direct cause of increased ratings.
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Finally, we consider an influx of fit-related reviews just prior to treatment. Here,
it would be these new reviews that help consumers discover products that are better
suited to their needs rather the Q&A.
We address these concerns through a series of robustness checks. First, we show
that there are no changes in review volume or product pageviews around each prod-
uct’s first answer, which we would expect in the presence of increased advertising.
Next, we collect additional data that allows us to construct a panel of product de-
scriptions, prices, and whether a product was being discounted. We find that our
results are robust to controlling for price, discounts, and description lengths. Us-
ing the same dataset, we also show that the content of product descriptions doesn’t
change significantly around the time the first Q&A arrives. Finally, we check whether
the content of reviews changes around the first Q&A and find this not to be the case.
We describe these robustness checks in detail below.
Changes in review volume or pageviews A product-specific marketing cam-
paign could raise demand for the product, leading to more Q&As, and if the market-
ing campaign is well-targeted, higher ratings. To guard against this concern we look
for direct evidence that a marketing campaign may have been taking place around
the time of each products’ first answer.14 We focus on two outcomes suggestive of
increased marketing activity: the daily number of reviews, and the daily number of
pageviews each products receives.
First, we examine whether review volume increases significantly following each
product’s first answer. To do so, we estimate Equation 2.8 using the daily count of
reviews each product receives as the dependent variable. As before, we instrument for
fit mismatch using holdout measures and include weekday fixed effects as additional
14We focus on a 180-day period centred around the first answer, but our results are robust to
other windows of time.
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controls. We present our results using each of the three fit mismatch measures in
Table 2.11. We find no significant change in review volume around the first answer.
This also hints at the fact that while Q&As improve match, they do not have a direct
effect on demand (proxied by the number of reviews) in the short term.
One concern with the analysis above is low power. Because reviews are relatively
infrequent, a change in review volume can be difficult to detect. To increase power,
we use click-stream data made available to us for a two month period (February and
March 2015), and repeat our analysis using daily pageviews — a more frequent event
— as our outcome. We estimate our regression using 1,091 products that receive their
first answers during that period. We present our results in Table 2.12. We see no
significant change in pageviews post treatment.15
Finally, we graphically examine any changes in review volume or pageviews in
the immediate neighborhood of the first answer. To do so, we estimate the following
model for our two discrete measures of fit mismatch, low rating and high variance:




βk × I{Djt = k}j + ǫjt (2.12)
where yjt is respectively the number of reviews or pageviews and I{Djt = k} is an
indicator for day k ∈ −30,30 for each product j. In Figure 2·3 and Figure 2·4, we
plot the βk coefficients from the volume and pageviews regressions, and observe no
significant irregularities in pageviews or review volume.
Controlling for price, promotions, and product description length Our
dataset lacks information on prices, and product descriptions over time. To deal with
this issue, we download historical prices and product descriptions from the Internet
Archive (IA), which is a non-profit digital library that collects historical snapshots
15We further address the issue of low power by using OLS on the full sample (results reported in
Table A.3 and Table A.4 of Appendix A), and still find null effects. Arguably, estimating a precise
zero effect even when mean reversion is present is a more stringent test of our hypothesis.
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of web pages. We are able to find historical snapshots for 5,020 out of the 5,077
products in our data. In total we collect 145,564 snapshots of product pages, with
an average of 29 snapshots per product. From each snapshot, we extract (a) the
displayed price, (b) whether this price is marked down (based on the presence of the
word “was” in the price field) and (c) the product description. We then associate
each review in our sample with its chronologically nearest snapshot. We re-estimate
our main specifications with three additional time-varying controls: prices, whether
there was a price promotion, and the length of the product description. We find that
our estimates for the impact of Q&A, shown in Table 2.13, are robust to the inclusion
of these controls.
Changes in the text of product descriptions One concern with the above esti-
mates is that character counts are a crude summary of product descriptions. Product
description might remain the same length even though their content changes. Thus,
we also investigate substantive changes in the contents of product descriptions within
a 180-day window centered on each product’s first answer. To do so, we turn each
product description into a bag-of-words representation: a vector of word counts scaled
by each word’s inverse document frequency (a measure known as “tf-idf” in the nat-
ural language processing literature (Ramos, 2003)). To quantify changes in product
descriptions over time, we choose each product’s first description as a reference point
and compute cosine similarities between the first description and all subsequent de-
scriptions. Finally, we estimate Equation 2.8 using these cosine similarities as our
dependent variable. If product descriptions change following Q&A arrival, we would
expect their cosine similarity to the reference description to decline. We report the re-
sults in Table 2.14. Overall, we see no decline in the similarity of product descriptions
following the each product’s first answer.
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Changes in review text One might be concerned that fit-uncertainty is resolved
by consumer reviews that arrive alongside Q&As. This concern is partly mitigated by
the fact that we control for the stock of pre-Q&A reviews received by each product
using product fixed effects. However, an increased flow of fit-related reviews that
coincides with the arrival of Q&As would bias our estimates. In this situation, we
would expect to see a change in the composition of review text in the period leading
to each product’s first answer reflecting an increased focus of reviews on fit-related
issues. To investigate changing trends in review text, we begin by fitting an LDA
topic model with 20 topics on all reviews prior to Q&As (the topics are available in
Appendix A)16 We then group reviews based on their arrival relative to each each
product’s first answer. Finally, we calculate the average proportion of each topic
within each group of reviews. We present these results in Figure 2·5. We observe
that topic proportions remain relatively flat over time, leading us to believe that the
contents of reviews do not abruptly change just prior to Q&A arrival.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study how the Q&A technology of e-commerce platforms affects
consumer choice. We start by providing an overview of ways in which Q&A and review
corpora differ, highlighting the differential ability of Q&As to resolve fit uncertainty.
Moreover, we show that negative reviews might often arise due to consumer-product
fit mismatch. Our main finding is that answering consumer questions can lead to
a subsequent increase in ratings, which is driven by a reduction in negative reviews
that arise from fit mismatch.
Overall, our findings have direct managerial implications for platforms, retailers
as well as consumers. In the face of an ever-growing demand for information from
16The choice of 20 topics is motivated by coherence score measures (Röder et al., 2015). We obtain
qualitatively similar results with different topic numbers that yield similar coherence scores.
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online shoppers, it is important to realize potential positive synergies that might ex-
ist between different UGC features. Understanding these synergies can be important
in guiding the platform’s adoption decisions when designing different interactive el-
ements to integrate into the product page. From the perspective of retailers, Q&As
might be an effective communication tool that directly allows them to interact with
consumers before purchases happen. In the case of management responses to reviews,
which also offer an avenue of retailer-consumer communication, it is often not pos-
sible to remedy the “damage” done by negative reviews, since this communication
is post-purchase. However, Q&As can serve as an effective reputation management
tool from that perspective, since they can serve to provide direct information that
aids better purchases and mitigates the risk of negative feedback. Finally, from the
standpoint of consumers, Q&As can lead to better informed purchases and hence
higher post-purchase satisfaction, which can be expected to result in fewer product
returns and more platform loyalty downstream.
Our results also have implications for the design of reputation systems. As we
show, negative reviews can arise not just due to poor quality, but due to idiosyncratic
fit mismatch. Platforms could consider running an algorithm similar to the classifier
we propose, which could disambiguate these two broad classes of reviews, and compute
a separate fit-based and quality-based average rating. This could be a possible way
to mitigate the usual problems associated with biased average ratings on e-commerce
platforms by leading customers to make more informed purchases.
A key limitation of our results is the inability to directly look at purchase behavior,
since we do not have access to enough purchase level data. Some research has started
to examine the impact of Q&As on purchases, and found evidence of a positive
impact (Khern-am nuai et al., 2020). Future research could investigate how Q&As
affect different stages of the purchase funnel (from consideration to purchase) and
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the implications this has for firms and consumers. Another limitation is not being
able to adopt a cross-platform identification strategy, which would have been able to
more robustly rule out unobservable time varying shocks. We were unable to find a
comparable platform that sells the same products but does not have Q&A.
It is also important to note that Q&As are not costless — there exists the possibil-
ity of potential information overload as more features accumulate on an e-commerce
platform (such as videos and photos posted by users). Further, in our dataset, most
questions have a single answer, but this is starting to change: for certain platforms,
almost all questions receive multiple answers. This might give rise to ambiguities
and perhaps change the objective/direct nature of the Q&A technology. Given these
developments, it would be worth exploring the limits of the effect we observe, and
better understanding what constitutes too much information (Branco et al., 2015).
On the whole, UGC implementations in general, and Q&A technology in partic-
ular, pose interesting problems for e-commerce websites that are worthy of further
exploration.
2.8 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary statistics.
Products Avg. rating Reviews Questions
Technology
Products with both Q&A and reviews 1175 4.37 153.6 23.78
(0.55) (138.5) (34.84)
Home & Garden
Products with both Q&A and reviews 3902 4.28 264.5 14.2
(0.436) (242.9) (16.3)
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Table 2.2: Top-10 product categories ordered by the average number
of questions received.
Category Questions Per Product
Set top boxes 42.79
iPod 23.84
Telephones and accessories 23.20
Televisions and accessories 19.40
DVD players 14.67
Fitted kitchens 13.94
Large kitchen appliances 13.51
Sat-nav and in-car entertainment 12.39
Heating and cooling 11.46
Kitchen electricals 10.83
Table 2.3: Top-3 LDA topics for reviews and Q&As.
Reviews Q&As
Quality (of vacuum) Dimensions
easy, great, good, cleaner, height, width, depth, dimensions,
clean, product, vacuum length, size, measurements
Quality (of electronics) Guarantee/Warranty
sound, good, great, clock, buy, bought, guarantee, product,
quality, set, radio warranty, year, item
Quality (of phone/camera) Compatibility (computers)
phone, easy, set, good, ipod, compatible, laptop,
camera, features, box windows, work, download, touch
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Table 2.4: Top-5 reviews with the highest predicted probabilities of
quality and fit issues.
Quality Fit
This fan was not worth the
money. It is poor quality for
value. wasnt very efficient and
broke after a couple of weeks.
The boxes are small but quite
strong. Quite small for the price
poor quality,some screws missing. Good quality - but too small for
my requirement would have pref-
ered it bigger
Poor quality, flimsy, and parts
missing. Returned!
I use as back up to ecomy 7 it is a
bit small though should have got
two or a bigger one
This clothes dryer fell apart be-
fore I had even erected it. Very
flimsy and poor quality. Took
back next day!
Bit small for what I needed if for
Poor quality, ended up in bin. Good Figures too small
Table 2.5: Top-20 words most predictive of quality/fit issues, esti-




































POST × Low Rating 0.243∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.031) (0.041)
POST × Hold-out Rating −0.901∗∗∗
(0.029)
POST −0.045∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗ 4.049∗∗∗ −0.011
(0.009) (0.012) (0.130) (0.012)
POST × Rating ∈ [2,3] 0.502∗∗∗
(0.101)
POST × Rating ∈ (3,4] 0.100∗∗∗
(0.037)
POST × Rating ∈ (4,5] −0.012
(0.012)
Review Rank 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0001∗ −0.0001∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00004) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F Statistic 312.91
Observations 345,168 184,811 184,811 184,811 184,811
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the product level.
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Table 2.7: The impact of Q&A on ratings using high pre-treatment









POST × High Variance 0.159∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.019) (0.030)
POST × Hold-out Variance 0.533∗∗∗
(0.016)
POST −0.061∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.026∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.019) (0.015)
Review Rank 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.00002 0.0001∗
(0.00004) (0.0001) (0.00004) (0.0001)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
F Statistic 380.08
Observations 345,168 184,811 184,811 184,811
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the product level.
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Table 2.8: The impact of Q&A on ratings using both low pre-
treatment ratings (≤ 4) and high pre-treatment rating variance (≥ 1)
as measures for fit mismatch.
IV
(2nd stage)
POST × Low Rating × Low Variance −0.594
(0.429)
POST × Low Rating × High Variance 0.125∗∗∗
(0.038)
POST × High Rating × Low Variance −0.010
(0.014)







Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the product level.
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Table 2.9: The impact of Q&A on ratings using the pre-treatment









POST × Fit 1.932∗∗∗ 1.948∗∗∗ 1.135∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.288) (0.356)
POST × Hold-out Fit 1.452∗∗∗
(0.054)
POST −0.039∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.013
(0.010) (0.012) (0.001) (0.013)
Review Rank 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗ −0.00000∗∗ 0.0001∗∗
(0.00005) (0.0001) (0.00000) (0.0001)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
F Statistic 239.46
Observations 345,168 184,811 184,811 184,811
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the product level.
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Table 2.10: Mechanism: products with a high fraction of pre-










POST × Fit −0.726∗∗∗ −0.590∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.065) (0.072)
POST × Hold-out Fit 1.452∗∗∗
(0.054)
POST 0.016∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Review Rank −0.00002∗∗∗ −0.00001 −0.00000∗∗ −0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
F Statistic 239.46
Observations 345,168 184,811 184,811 184,811
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the product level.







POST × Low Rating −0.033
(0.071)
POST × High Variance 0.020
(0.052)
POST × Fit −0.543
(0.732)
POST 0.094 0.080 0.100
(0.075) (0.078) (0.076)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,257 25,257 25,257
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the product level.
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POST × Low Rating 3.708
(4.191)
POST × High Variance 1.413
(1.133)
POST × Fit 7.216
(9.394)
POST −0.987 −0.632 −0.186
(1.630) (1.040) (0.819)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,614 8,614 8,614
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the product level.
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Table 2.13: The impact of Q&A on ratings controlling for price, dis-







POST × Low Rating 0.120∗∗∗
(0.041)
POST × High Variance 0.084∗∗∗
(0.030)
POST × Fit 1.111∗∗∗
(0.352)
POST −0.014 −0.028∗ −0.015
(0.012) (0.015) (0.013)
Review Rank 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
On Sale −0.025∗∗ −0.025∗∗ −0.025∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
log(Price) −0.141∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.142∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
log(Desc. Length) 0.026 0.026 0.025
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 184,705 184,705 184,705
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the product level.
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POST × Low Rating 0.003 0.018∗
(0.005) (0.009)
POST × High Variance 0.008 0.013
(0.004) (0.007)
POST × Fit −0.002 0.083
(0.033) (0.067)
POST −0.003 −0.006 −0.006 −0.007 −0.003 −0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,432 14,741 20,432 14,741 20,432 14,741
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Standard errors clustered at the product level.
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2.9 Figures







































































































































(c) Average lag between a question












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10+
Answers per question
(d) Distribution of the number of
answers per question.
Figure 2·1: Descriptive features of UGC: We find that the accumula-
tion of questions has risen steadily over time (in parallel with reviews),
questions have been attracting answers faster over time, and most ques-
tions have a single answer.
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DIY tools and power tools
Lawnmowers and garden power tools
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Pct. of negative reviews due to fit issues
Figure 2·2: Percentage of negative reviews (≤ 3 stars) that are due to
fit-related issues by product category. (Limited to categories with at
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Figure 2·3: The evolution of review volume for products with low
ratings (top) and high variance (bottom), pre and post treatment (in-
dicated by 0), measured 30 days around the first answer. The points
plot the βk coefficient estimates from Equation 2.12, and the bars indi-
cate the 95% confidence interval. We see that there are no significant
irregularities around the first answer time, thus mitigating the threat
















































































































































Figure 2·4: The evolution of pageviews for products with low ratings
(top) and high variance (bottom), pre and post treatment (indicated by
0), measured 30 days around the first answer. The points plot the βk
coefficient estimates from Equation 2.12, and the bars indicate the 95%
confidence interval. We see that there are no significant irregularities
around the first answer time, thus mitigating the threat of omitted
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Figure 2·5: Plot of LDA topic weights for 20 topics, computed based
on reviews that came from 0 up to 200 days prior to Q&A. We see no
evidence of a change in review composition prior to Q&A arrival.
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Chapter 3
Reference Price Effects In Vacation
Rental Markets
Do consumers respond to prices advertised by firms, but irrelevant to the actual pur-
chase price? A large literature on advertised reference prices (ARPs) has shown this
to be true in various settings. However, ARPs are typically framed as discounts that
serve to emphasize transaction utility. Our focus in this chapter is on “floor” ARPs
that are particularly prevalent on vacation rental platforms. These prices appear in
the form of a “Starting from”/“From” price when a user conducts searches without
entering any dates. It is not clear how the accuracy of these price estimates relative
to the true price might affect downstream outcomes. We thus conduct field exper-
iments on a travel aggregator (Holidu.com) to investigate how consumers respond
when “From” price estimates are raised. Our results indicate that higher floor prices
actually lead to decreased engagement (as measured by outbound clicks, number of
searches, and time spent on the website), and directionally negative effects on booking
related outcomes. These effects occur despite higher floor prices providing users with
an estimate closer to actual (i.e dated) prices on average. We further demonstrate the
possible moderating effects of acquisition channel and price levels. Overall, contrary
to the sticker-shock theory wherein consumers are deterred if offered a low initial
price estimate and a higher price further down the purchase funnel, we see that price
obfuscation in the form of less accurate upfront prices can lead to more engagement.
Platforms thus need to carefully evaluate the correct “balance” between optimising
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customer engagement and providing accurate price estimates upfront.
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3.1 Introduction
A reference price is defined as the standard against which the purchase price of a
product is judged (Monroe, 1973). A sizeable literature in marketing, economics and
psychology has established the various channels through which these prices can im-
pact purchase likelihood, brand evaluations and other outcomes of interest. Reference
prices that are formulated by consumers themselves (typically internal or external ref-
erence prices) usually rely on past purchase experiences, or prices of other comparable
products. Thus, retailers cannot exert direct control over them. Nor can researchers
directly observe such constructed reference prices, making it hard to conduct infer-
ence. On the other hand, advertised reference prices (ARPs) are supplied by sellers
themselves, and can thus serve as a direct tool of comparative price advertising with
which consumer price perceptions may be altered.
Typically, ARPs are presented in a "was-now" framing, or as a striked through
price to emphasize apparent savings off a given list price. This is the framing that has
received most attention in the literature. Several recent empirical studies have exam-
ined ARPs of this form, and found high ARPs to have a positive impact on purchase
likelihood (Ngwe, 2018), and well as the likelihood of accepting the offered price with-
out initiating negotiations (Jindal, 2018). The posited mechanisms for these effects
is that high ARPs make the offer price more attractive, thus enhancing transaction
utility. These effects are generally stronger for users with lesser category experience,
who cannot precisely estimate the true market price of the item in question.
However, in the context of online marketplaces, platforms have a lot of flexibility
in showcasing ARPs beyond just ceiling prices. With the vast majority of online
prices being consumer-specific and customisable, retailers have to make decisions
with regard to defaults, i.e, prices that are displayed before any specifics are entered.
This decision is particularly relevant in the context of marketplaces or aggregators,
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who are often themselves not price setters, but have complete control over the way
price information is presented on the product page. These alternative ARPs have not
received as much attention in the literature till now.
Our focus in this project will be on one such ARP variant that is increasingly
being adopted by online marketplaces: namely, the “Starting from” price (hence-
forth referred to interchangeably as the floor price). For vacation rental platforms in
particular, which is our setting, floor prices are ubiquitously showcased to consumers
when they search for accommodations without entering any dates. They are also used
heavily in the context of search engine optimisation by aggregators such as Tripad-
visor and Booking.com - for example, a generic Google search for “hotels in Boston”
contains floor price information in the returned results (see Figure 3·1). Despite the
heavy adoption of these floor ARPs, there is no clear guidance on how these estimates
should be constructed to optimise click-through, conversion, and other outcomes of
interest. Should the window of prices over which the minimum is computed be se-
lected in such a way that the lowest possible price is displayed, or is a higher (more
realistic) floor price favourable?
Both floor and ceiling ARPs seek to make the offer price more attractive. However,
for ceiling ARPs, the primary channel of influence is through a perceived sense of
savings, i.e, emphasizing transaction utility, while the mode of operation for floor
ARPs is unclear. Based on the literature, we hypothesize two primary mechanisms.
The first possible mechanism draws from the “sticker shock” effect, namely that
a large discrepancy between an upfront displayed price (which in our case is the
floor price) and the true price leads to a negative surprise, thus adversely impacting
firm outcomes (Winer, 1986). The second mechanism, however, would predict the
opposite. Building on the theory of price obfuscation and salience (Ellison, 2005),
this mechanism predicts that a lower floor price amounts to making prices less salient,
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and will have a positive effect on subsequent outcomes.
Testing the impact of floor prices empirically in the context of online marketplaces
is difficult with observational data, since any variation in displayed floor prices is likely
to come from proprietary algorithmic changes that may be correlated with listing
rankings. Thus, it is impossible to tease apart whether any effect on engagement is
brought about by the algorithm as a whole, or by specific changes to the displayed floor
price. Moreover, platforms are often unwilling or unable to exogenously manipulate
displayed prices, which partially explains the limited number of field experiments in
the literature that explicitly manipulate reference prices.
We are able to address these challenges by leveraging two unique price experiments
with roughly 6 million users, conducted in partnership with Holidu.com (a Europe-
based travel aggregator). Our treatment raises floor prices seen at the user level by
10% above the baseline. Further, the intervention occurs site-wide, thus alleviating
concerns of non-experimental contamination. We find that in the treatment condition,
engagement metrics such as outbound clicks, number of subsequent searches and time
spent on the website are all affected negatively. Booking related outcomes are more
noisy, but provide suggestive evidence: there is a directionally negative effect both
on the propensity to book, as well as the total amount users spend on the website.
These results back recent empirical evidence from Blake et al. (2018), who demon-
strate that displaying full prices upfront (relative to adding taxes and fees at the
checkout page) decreases both the quantity and quality of ticket purchases made on
Stubhub.com. While our data does not provide direct evidence for booking level
outcomes due to sparsity, it complements these results by focusing on engagement
metrics and demonstrating that consumer attrition occurs at every stage of the pur-
chase funnel when higher floor prices are displayed. Thus, we find evidence in favor
of price salience effects, and against sticker shock effects in our context.
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Although higher “From” prices intuitively amount to providing more transpar-
ent price signals, it is an empirical question whether users are actually seeing more
accurate prices in our experiment. To examine this, we narrow down on the set of
users who conduct at least one search with a date, and are thus exposed to both
dated (actual) and undated (floor) prices. We then compute the average user-level
difference (henceforth referred to as the wedge) in these prices. We see that users
in the treatment group see prices which are on average 10% closer to dated prices.
Hence, higher floor prices do provide a more realistic estimate. However, even within
this sample of consumers, outbound clicks continue to be affected negatively as a
result of the treatment. We further examine how the absolute level of the wedge
affects outcomes. Our experimental variation is no longer free of bias in this case,
since dated prices are not randomly assigned across treatment and control groups.
We thus rely on an instrumental variables strategy to estimate the Average Causal
Response (ACR)(Angrist and Imbens, 1995) - we instrument the wedge with the bi-
nary treatment assignment variable to extract the part of the variation induced by
random assignment. Doing so, we find that a higher wedge leads to positive outcomes
- namely, a greater discrepancy between actual prices and floor prices actually leads
to favourable outcomes, in line with our previous results.
Finally, we employ recent advances in causal machine learning to explore the
space of conditional average treatment effects (CATEs), and to see whether we can
detect meaningful heterogeneity in the treatment effects conditional of pre-treatment
covariates. We use a doubly robust approach to compute individual level treatment
effects, which are then projected on to the covariate space. This class of estimators
produces a CATE which can tell us if there is heterogeneity in treatment effects
for specific sub-groups formed based on observed pre-treatment covariates. Doing
so, we broadly find negative effects across several different covariates. Interestingly
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however, we find that users coming to the platform through Facebook search tend
to spend more time on the website, and have directionally higher values of booking
propensity and booking value. We also find that (1) the decline in outbound clicks in
proportional to price level (defined by the average price of listings seen by a user), (2)
booking metrics are negative and marginally significant for the lowest price level and
(3) the reduction in engagement (time on site and searches) is affected more strongly
at higher price levels.
Our paper contributes to the nascent but growing literature on online ARPs. More
specifically, we are among the first to investigate the effects of displayed floor prices
using a large-scale field experiment and real browsing behaviour. Our findings have
implications for platforms and regulators who aim to provide consumers with more
accurate price estimates upfront, and demonstrates that such a policy change might
have unintended consequences.
3.2 Related work
Our paper relates broadly to literature on behavioral pricing and reference prices,
as well as those on price obfuscation and fairness. In the following sections, we will
provide a brief overview of existing work in each of these domains, and delineate our
contribution relative to this literature.
3.2.1 Advertised Reference Prices
Transaction utility theory (Thaler, 1985) was among the first frameworks to show
that buyers obtain some benefit simply from the perception that they paid less than
their reference price. Subsequently, a large body of work has established the positive
influence of firm-provided/advertised reference prices (ARPs) on perceived offer value
(Urbany et al., 1988), purchase intent (Della Bitta et al., 1981; Bearden et al., 1984)
and search intent (Della Bitta et al., 1981). The channel of influence is often through
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internal reference prices (IRP) - researchers theorize that ARP is first assimilated into
the IRP, which in turn influences purchase behavior or evaluations (Mazumdar et al.,
2005). The ability of ARP to influence IRP is found to be affected by the plausibility of
the ARP (e.g, Urbany et al. (1988)), as well as the difference between the ARP and the
actual selling price (for instance, Kopalle and Lindsey-Mullikin (2003) find a U-shaped
relationship between advertised reference prices and consumer price expectations). It
is also influenced by semantic cues (e.g., was-now versus compare at) that retailers use
to frame the sale (Lichtenstein et al., 1991). In addition to the above, plausibly high
ARPs have also been shown to increase internal reference price standards, and thus
enhance fairness perceptions of the offered price (Lichtenstein and Bearden, 1989; Xia
et al., 2004). While most of these papers make use of lab experiments, Mayhew and
Winer (1992) were among the first to use actual transactions data to study the role
of ARP in affecting consumer choices.
There has also been a recent upsurge of papers utilising real transaction data
and non-survey based experimental design. For instance, Huang (2018) utilizes lab
experiments to show that high ARPs provide consumers transaction utility which
increases their likelihood to purchase. Ngwe (2018) utilises transaction data on a
clothing retailer and shows that “fake discounts” in the form of high list prices (with
the actual price being marked down relative to that list price) have a strong influence
on purchase outcomes, with a $1 increase in the list price having the same positive
effect on purchase likelihood on average as a $0.77 decrease in the actual selling price.
This effect is larger for fake list prices, but smaller in longer-lived stores and stores
closer to regular retail channels. Jindal (2018) also uses purchase data and shows
that high ARPs increase the negotiated price of big ticket items.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the bulk of work in this space has focused
on ceiling ARPs that are framed as a promotion. There has been lesser focus on
62
floor ARPs and other unconventional price estimates that are prevalent in online
marketplaces. We are also among the first to conduct large scale field experiments
that systematically manipulate floor prices and examine how user interactions with
the platform evolve as a result.
3.2.2 Price obfuscation and salience
The decision of displaying low floor prices can also be looked upon as a form of
price obfuscation, given it can lead consumers to underestimate the eventual price
they have to pay. Our work therefore contributes to the literature on digital obfus-
cation strategies and their possible effects. Broadly, obfuscation can be thought of
as an action that raises search costs, which can lead to less consumer learning and
higher profits (Ellison, 2005; Ellison and Ellison, 2018). Another way to think about
obfuscation is in relation to sales of “add-ons” at high unadvertised prices, which can
raise equilibrium profits in a competitive price discrimination model. Designing prod-
ucts to require add-ons can thereby be a profit-enhancing obfuscation strategy even
when consumers correctly infer all prices. In fact, even when consumers are aware of
add-on pricing policies, they prefer to give their business to firms who “shroud” prices
because these sophisticated consumers end up with a subsidy from policies designed
for myopic customers (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006).
In a different domain, Chetty et al. (2009) demonstrates how lesser obfuscation
(in the form of tax salience) can have a negative impact of demand. Specifically, the
paper shows how commodity taxes that are included in posted prices reduce demand
significantly more than taxes that are not included in posted prices. The fact that
individuals make such optimization errors even with relatively simple, linear com-
modity taxes suggests that more complex policies such as income taxes or transfers
could generate very different behavioral responses from those predicted by standard
models.
63
Several recent studies have further explored possible gains and related caveats
from obfuscation strategies in digital settings. For instance, Allender et al. (2021)
find in an online experiment that price obfuscation is highly effective at mitigating
consumer peer-induced fairness concerns, in turn raising the average price charged.
They further find that buyers are more likely to make a purchase when the prices
are obfuscated even though they knew the seller had intentionally, and strategically,
reduced price transparency. Sellers may use strategic obfuscation to avoid fairness-
based barriers to individual pricing, without the need to negotiate prices. However,
there is a trade-off between the peer induced and distributional fairness concerns: once
the prices are obfuscated consumers shift their attention to evaluate the distributional
inequity more scrupulously.
Mamadehussene (2020) demonstrates that there is tension between platforms and
firms regarding how much price complexity is used: firms would like to use even more
obfuscation than what the platform allows, so the platform must monitor firms’ prices
to make sure that they are not excessively complex.
Finally, Blake et al. (2018) find that price obfuscation on Stubhub (i.e, having
back-end fees) leads to higher revenue relative to upfront prices. Detailed click-
stream data shows that obfuscation makes price comparisons difficult and results in
consumers spending more than they otherwise would. Consumers who are shown fees
upfront drop off early in the purchase funnel, while those shown fees later are more
likely to exit after the site displays total prices, consistent with consumer misinfor-
mation. However, salience persists beyond initial misinformation. Experienced users,
who arguably should anticipate the fee, spend 15% more on StubHub when the fee is
shrouded. This behavior suggests that experience with Back-end Fees does not give
users an advantage in anticipating true final prices. In general however, the paper
notes considerable heterogeneity in the pricing practices of platforms, which points to
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the need for more empirical work that can tease apart the effects of price obfuscation
in a digital setting.
Our results draw from the obfuscation and price salience literature and demon-
strate an empirical application of the positive impact of obfuscation strategies on
engagement metrics. By doing so, our paper contributes to studies of alternative
methods of obfuscation, such as add-on pricing and partitioned pricing. Similar to
Blake et al. (2018), exact (i.e dated) prices in our setting constitute surcharges rather
than add-ons because they are unavoidable. We might interpret the displayed per
night price as a form of partitioned pricing (Morwitz et al., 1998) where the base
(floor) price is essentially augmented by the nightly surcharge, depending on tempo-
ral demand and other factors. One interpretation of our findings is that price salience
amplifies the effect of partitioned pricing.
3.2.3 Fairness perceptions
Our work also relates to the literature on ambiguous price claims and price fairness.
Central to any model of price fairness is the notion that buyers, either explicitly or
implicitly, have some sort of reference price they use to assess whether or not a price
is fair.
Previous research on price fairness shows that a perceived price discrepancy might
cause negative fairness perceptions for consumers (Xia et al., 2004). Relatedly, this
can also be a form of deceptive advertising. Lab studies have demonstrated that while
deceptive advertising can increase false brand attribute beliefs (Burke et al., 1988), it
can engender distrust which negatively affects response to subsequent ads (Darke and
Ritchie, 2007). Papers have also demonstrated negative effects of buyer antagonism.
For instance, Anderson and Simester (2010) find in a field experiment that customers
react by making fewer subsequent purchases if they buy a product and later observe
the same retailer selling it for less.
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In the context of hotel resort fees, Sullivan (2017) finds that separating mandatory
resort fees from posted room rates without first disclosing the total price is likely to
harm consumers by increasing the search costs and cognitive costs of finding and
choosing hotel accommodations. The analysis finds this strategy is unlikely to result
in benefits that offset the possible harm to consumers. Interestingly, however, our
findings suggest that consumers are driven less by fairness perceptions than they are
by the upfront price displayed on the website. Although higher floor prices are more
accurate, and thus more fair, consumers engage with the platform less in our specific
setting.
3.3 Conceptual framework
Our goal is to demonstrate the impact of high floor prices on engagement metrics
such as outbound clicks, number of searches and time spent on the website, as well
as downstream metrics like bookings and booking value. Based on the literature,
we hypothesize that displaying higher floor prices can have one of two effects. The
first possible mechanism draws from the “sticker shock” theory, namely that a large
discrepancy between an upfront displayed price (which in our case is the “From” price)
and the true price to be paid leads to a negative surprise, thus adversely affecting
product level outcomes (Winer, 1986). A smaller sticker shock is also plausibly related
to greater fairness perceptions among consumers (Xia et al., 2004) - high floor prices
can lead consumers to anchor their expectations upwards, which leads to a smaller
discrepancy with the actual price, thus stimulating them to trust the platform and
engage more. If this is the dominant mechanism operating in our context, we would
expect higher floor prices to lead to more favourable outcomes.
However, the second posited mechanism builds on the theory of price obfuscation
and salience (Ellison, 2005; Chetty et al., 2009) and yields the opposite prediction.
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Obfuscation has been theoretically and empirically shown to raise firm profits, while
salience (e.g posting tax-inclusive price tags rather than applying taxes at the register)
reduces demand. These effects have been shown to persist even when consumers are
aware of prices being obfuscated. This mechanism predicts that floor prices are an
implicit tool for obfuscation. Under that assumption, a higher floor price amounts to
increasing the salience of true prices, and will have a negative effect on subsequent
outcomes.
To formalize our intuition, we build on a stylised model developed by Blake et al.
(2018), and illustrated in Figure 3·2. Let J be the set of hotel listings faced by
consumers under the default floor price regime. The consumer’s optimisation problem
is to make a quality-price tradeoff as they are forming their consideration set and
deciding whether to engage with the platform. For illustrative purposes, we will
focus on the consumer’s decision to click. However, similar arguments follow for each










i denote the true quality
and price level that correspond with the choice of i. Following Blake et al. (2018), θ
captures the trade-off between quality and price. Higher values of θ indicate a steeper
indifference curve whereby consumers are willing to pay more for greater quality.
The outside option is denoted by 0, with q0 = p0 = 0. The straight line v0 = 0
marks the consumer’s indifference curve from not interacting with the site. Given J,
the consumer chooses ptruei and q
true
i to maximise utility v
′ > 0. For consumers with
low enough values of θ (less steep indifference curves in Figure 3·2), their indifference
curve v0 = 0 lies fully below the set J, and they will not click out. It therefore follows
that given a set of hotels J, there exists a threshold type θ′ > 0 such that a consumer
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of type θ will click out if and only if θ > θ′.
When consumers conduct a search without dates, they do not see ptruei but a
pfloori , which is a noisy signal of p
true
i . Building on the reference price literature, we
assume that the perception of ptruei is influenced by p
floor
i seen by consumers. Let
the perceived price be p̃truei .






When pfloori is raised, the following scenarios may occur:
1. Price salience theory would predict that consumers shift their perception about
p̃truei upwards. This effectively shifts the choice set J to the left (to the perceived
choice set J’), whereby consumers perceive that they have to pay a greater price
for the same qtruei levels.
2. On the contrary, the sticker shock theory would suggest that consumers derive
positive utility from accurate price estimates, and a large discrepancy creates
disutility (salience models typically do not account for such effects). In this
case, raising pfloori amounts to calibrating more accurate price expectations,
as a result of which consumer trust in the platform, and quality assessment
increases. Resultantly, the consumer perceives greater quality at the same ptruei
levels. Hence, the perceived J shifts right to J”.
Following the intuition of Blake et al. (2018), a leftward shift of the choice set
implies a negative impact on choice, whereas a rightward shift implies a positive
impact. This is because, the set of consumers with θ < θ′ will prefer not to click if
they perceive the set of listings to be J. Some of these consumers, however, will select
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a listing if they perceive the choice set to be J”. Conversely, some consumers who
would have clicked under choice set J will choose not to do so under choice set J’.
Our empirical results find support for the price salience theory - in other words,
raising floor prices leads consumers to perceive the “true” choice set as J’, and deters
a subset of consumers from engaging with the platform, with indications of possible
negative effects on bookings and booking value too.
3.4 Experimental details
3.4.1 Experiment design
Our aim is to examine the effects of raising floor ARPs on consumer level browsing
and booking behavior. Consistent with this aim, our unit of randomisation is at
the user (cookie) level. This ensures that a specific user-device combination gets
assigned to the same treatment condition every time they conduct a search through
the duration of our experiment, as long as they do not clear out their cookies. Floor
prices are visible to any consumer who conducts at least one search without a date
(this condition is satisfied by 97% of our sample). Each time a unique user visits the
website and conducts a non-dated search, they are assigned with equal probability
to either the baseline1, or the higher floor price (treatment) condition. Each search
also triggers an impression event, which gives us detailed information on the specific
listings that the user is exposed to for a given search, and the associated prices they
see. For our subsequent analysis, we will aggregate all search-level metrics at the user
level.
What makes our experimental setting different from most extant literature on
reference prices in general, and ARPs in particular, is that we can exogenously vary
1Baseline floor prices are computed by the platform using cached information for each listing,
e.g previous prices, or price information supplied by the listing itself. For our experiment, the exact
algorithm used to calculate the baseline does not matter, since we uniformly raise it by 10% in the
treatment condition.
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these prices, and thus measure their role in affecting outcomes of interest. An al-
ternative research question could have been to examine the role of the “From” price
widget as a whole. To do this, we would need to expose users to a version of the
website with floor prices, and one without. This would tell us whether explicitly
helping consumers to construct their price expectations, rather than relying on their
autonomous expectations based on experience, competitors, etc serves the platform
better. However, we have no way of knowing consumers’ autonomous expectations
and how they are constructed. In the setting of a field experiment, there is no natural
way to solicit these internal expectations either. Given these constraints, we feel that
our design (and associated conclusions) are more managerially relevant.
3.4.2 Data
Our data comes from Holidu.com, a Europe-based travel aggregator, with close to
15 million listings across the world.2 Our experiments are conducted in two waves, in
2019 (March 5th to April 23rd) and 2020 (January 29th to March 13th). Each time,
the experimental manipulation is applied site-wide, thus mitigating concerns of non-
experimental interference. Power calculations were conducted based on results from
the first experiment, and the second experiment is pre-registered at asPredicted.org.3
There were 6,979,342 users in total who were exposed to floor prices, searching for
accommodation across 35,950 cities in 89 countries. These users originated from
37 unique domains, which serve as a rough proxy for origin country locations. As
mentioned before, the treatment status of a user (as identified by cookies) remains
2https://www.holidu.com/
3We originally intended to use data only from the follow-up experiment and not include the
pilot results. Unfortunately, due to the global coronavirus pandemic, we had to halt our follow-up
experiment before attaining an adequate sample size (roughly 7 million) to detect a 5% change in our
booking metrics (propensity to book and booking value). Resultantly, we pooled together results for
both experiments to give us a bit more precision, but still not enough to detect changes smaller than
5% for the booking metrics. However, despite not attaining statistical significance, the directional
negative effects on bookings described in the Results section provide complementary evidence for
the likely implications of raising floor prices.
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unchanged during the duration of the experiment, so we can observe whether each
user conducts multiple searches, and the specific impression events triggered during
each search. A total of 31.9 million searches are conducted by these users during the
experiments, which are aggregated at the user level for our analysis. 63.1% of searches
lead to users browsing a single page of the returned results (i.e, one page of impression
events) - 97.02% of all searches remain within the first 10 pages of impressions.
Users are randomised into one of two floor price conditions: baseline and baseline
+ 10% (example in Figure 3·3). In the 2019 version of the experiment, a third
condition (baseline + 5%) was also used, but we do not use results from that group for
consistency. Resultantly, we are left with a total of 6,385,717 users. Participants are
split virtually equally into the two conditions, thus indicating that our randomisation
was successful. We look at six main outcomes: outbound clicks, total number of dated
searches, total number of overall searches, the likelihood of booking, booking value and
total time spent on the website (measured as the timestamp difference between the
first and last searches conducted by the user during the experiment). These variables
are summarised in Table 3.1. We also collect data on user-level covariates, namely
acquisition channel, device type, browser, host, country searched for, number of pre-
experiment searches and the number of search results returned. Using individual
impressions, we are also able to calculate the general price level yielded by a given
search query by computing the average floor price across all apartments the user has
browsed. For the treatment group, we reduce this average by 10% to give the prices
users would have seen at baseline. This de-biased price level can also be treated a pre-
treatment covariate (in the sense that it is unaffected by treatment status and depends
on user-level unobservables such as any specific search terms or filters they may have
applied). We then divide this price level into quantiles, which enters subsequent
regressions as a set of dummy variables.
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Next, we do a balance check on these pre-treatment user-level covariates. In
addition to those defined above, we also use the year of the experiment (2019 vs 2020)
and the day of week for a user’s first visit for balance checks. We find no significant
differences across the treatment and baseline conditions across most of these variables
(Figure 3·4). The distributions of four covariates (device type, country searched for,
price quantiles and host) appear to be significantly different based on a chi-squared
test (Figure 3·5). However, chance imbalances are more likely given the large sample
size of our experiment. For these covariates, we calculate the Cramer’s V (Agresti,
1996), which provides a measure of the effect size for a chi-squared test, and find that
the size of these differences is negligible - the usual rule of thumb for a small Cramer’s
V is 0.1, whereas the values we find are about 100 times (or more) lower than that
(Table 3.2). Further, we control for all baseline covariates in our regression estimates
to mitigate any remaining concerns of selection on observables.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 ATE of high floor prices
First, we demonstrate the effect of displaying higher “From” prices at the user
level. Given random assignment, our goal is to simply estimate the average treatment
effect (ATE), i.e, differences in outcomes for the treated group relative to the control
group: E[Oi|Treatedi = 1] − E[Oi|Treatedi = 0], where Oi is the outcome for user i,
and Treatedi indicates their treatment status. Specifically, for each of the 6 outcomes
in Table 3.1, we estimate OLS regressions of the following form:
Oi = α +βTreatedi + ǫi
Oi = α +βTreatedi +γXi + ǫi
(3.3)
where Xi represents the following covariates: device type, channel type, region
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country, number of previous searches, an indicator for the year of the experiment
(2019 vs 2020), browser family and host.
The main results are in Table 3.3. We find that treatment group users have
fewer outbound clicks, fewer overall searches, fewer dated searches (including a lower
likelihood of entering dates), and spend lesser time on the website, indicating a higher
bounce rate. The addition of control variables leads to very similar point estimates,
reported in Table 3.4. The effect size ranges from 0.5% to 1.3% of the mean outcome
values. Although small, these effect sizes are comparable to those obtained in studies
of online marketplaces (e.g ad experiments). Furthermore, our intervention is fairly
light, since it only changes displayed floor prices by 10% - a stronger (but still realistic)
manipulation is likely to yield larger effects.
Consistent with Blake et al. (2018), we also find directional evidence of a negative
impact on the likelihood of booking, as well as the total amount spent. As described
in the Data section, we do not have enough power to detect statistically significant
effects on these sparse outcomes, but the directional results are suggestive of negative
impacts across the purchase funnel.4
3.5.2 ATE for users exposed to actual prices
We demonstrate that raising floor ARPs has a negative effect on engagement
metrics across different stages of the purchase funnel. Next, we want to understand
whether the magnitude of discrepancy between floor prices and actual prices might
affect outcomes. This can serve as a direct test for the sticker shock hypothesis, which
posits that consumers should be averse to a larger gap between true and expected or
promised prices. To do this, we narrow down to the set of users (=3,041,708) who
conducted at least one search with dates, and thus were exposed to the ‘true’ price
4For the same reasons, we are not able to fully explore the “intensive margin” effects shown by
Blake et al. (2018).
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levels. We can then measure the average difference in dated and undated prices on
a per-user basis (henceforth referred to as the wedge, computed at the user level as
AvgPricedated − AvgPricefloor, where AvgPrice is the average price across all impres-
sions the user has been exposed to).
First, we examine whether the wedge is indeed different across the two groups.
Doing so, in Table 3.5, we find that consistent with our treatment assignment, the
average difference between dated and undated prices is 10% higher in the control
group relative to the treatment group. This demonstrates that displayed prices are
on average more accurate (closer to dated prices) in the treatment condition than at
baseline. If the sticker shock theory were applicable, we would thus expect a positive
treatment effect for this sample.
It is important to note however, that any analysis on this sample is not entirely
free from selection bias. This is because, the set of users who choose to enter dates
after being faced with a high floor price may differ from those that enter dates in
the baseline condition, since the probability of conducting a dated search is lower by
about 0.4% in the treatment condition.
While we cannot fully mitigate this bias, a few points are worth noting. Firstly, we
do not find evidence of selection on observables by using our pre-treatment covariates
and computing propensity scores across treatment and control group users (all values
are centred at 0.5 and overlapping). However, selection on unobservables is still
possible. The most intuitive source of unobservable selection is that users who enter
dates in the treatment condition are less price sensitive. This would mean that users
in the treatment group are less likely to be adversely affected by seeing higher prices,
and any effects on engagement metrics that we estimate based on this sample would
represent a lower bound of the possible negative impact of raising floor prices. Indeed,
estimating Equation 3.3 on this sample of users, we continue to find a negative and
74
significant effect on outbound clicks and dated searches, although the other outcomes
are not significant but directionally negative (Table 3.6). Even though the results are
more noisy, they do provide evidence against the sticker shock theory since the sign
does not flip on any of our coefficients.
Next, we directly look at the wedge as an independent variable, instead of the
binary treatment indicator. This will give us a sense of how the magnitude of price
difference affects engagement metrics. However, for this analysis, we would ideally
wish to vary the wedge exogenously for every user. In other words, we would need to
ensure that the average dated prices seen by users in both conditions remain identical.
Consistent with the presence of some selection effects, this turns out to be not the
case in our sample - we see that dated prices tend to be higher in treatment, and
this difference persists even after controlling for other covariates (Table 3.7). We
cannot explicitly control for dated prices in Equation 3.3, since it is a post-treatment
outcome. Thus, the OLS interpretation of this specification is complicated by the
fact that dated prices differ across treatment conditions.
To overcome this concern, we rely on a strategy which generalises the LATE
(Local Average Treatment Effect) framework. The idea behind the LATE framework
is to characterize compliers among a population of treated individuals and compute
the complier average causal effect (CACE) within this population. For instance, if
participants are randomized to receive a flyer encouraging them to get vaccinated,
the LATE framework allows us to compute the effect of the vaccine on those who
actually choose to get vaccinated as a result of the flyer (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
This example considers that both the endogenous variable (getting vaccinated)
and the instrument (receiving a flyer) are binary. The LATE framework can be
extended even to the case of continuous endogenous variables (which for us is the
wedge). Doing so, we can isolate the part of the variation in the wedge that is due
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to treatment, and thus quantify its impact on outcomes. It has been shown that,
given mild regularity assumptions, IV independence assumptions identify a weighted
average of per-unit causal effects along the length of an appropriately defined causal
response function. Conventional instrumental variables and Two-Stage Least Squares
procedures can be interpreted as estimating the average causal response to the variable
treatment (Angrist and Imbens, 1995).
We implement this strategy by estimating the following regression:
Oi = αi +β1 ·Ŵedgei +X
′
i ·β2 + ǫ̃i, (3.4)
Wedgei = α̃i +γ1 ·Treatedi +X
′
i ·γ2 + ũi. (3.5)
The exclusion restriction assumes that the only channel of influence the treatment
variable has on outcomes is through its effect on the wedge. Since our treatment is
essentially to vary the displayed price, this assumption seems reasonable.
OLS estimates of Equation 3.4 are depicted in Table 3.8. With the OLS estimates,
we find a negative and significant relationship between the wedge and outbound clicks,
which is suggestive of the sticker shock hypothesis: the larger the wedge, the lesser the
number of clickouts. The same pattern holds for time spent on the website. However,
for the search and booking value metrics, we find a positive effect, indicating that
larger wedges lead to more searches and higher booking value. As mentioned before,
these OLS estimates might not lend themselves to a causal interpretation because
the wedge is not randomly assigned (average dated prices vary across treatment and
control groups). To mitigate these concerns, we move onto the ACR estimation using
treatment assignment as an instrument. These estimates are in Table 3.9. As also
shown in Table 3.5, we find a strong first stage, indicating that the wedge in the
treatment group is on average lower (i.e floor price estimates are more accurate), as
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expected. Now, all our other results are consistent with the main specification: all
engagement metrics other than dated searches are affected positively, in proportion
to the size of the wedge. For example, the coefficient for outbound clicks (0.002) can
be interpreted as follows: if the value of the wedge goes up by $10, the number of
outbound clicks increases by 0.02. This provides further support against the sticker
shock hypothesis, and in favor of obfuscation - users do not increase their engagement
if the wedge is reduced.
3.5.3 Treatment effect heterogeneity: CATE
So far, we have demonstrated that on average, raising floor prices leads to a de-
cline in engagement outcomes across users. This effect persists even within users who
are directly exposed to the difference in dated (i.e, ‘true’) and floor prices, further
supporting the hypothesis that price salience in the form of more transparent price
signals can in fact negatively affect outcomes. In this section, we report some explo-
rations of treatment effect heterogeneity to show which specific groups of users might
be affected most strongly. The ATE measures the effect of the intervention over the
entire population, but to measure how treatment effects vary across respondent char-
acteristics we estimate a conditional average treatment effect (CATE) (e.g Imai et al.
(2013)).
Let Yi(1)(Yi(0)) denote the potential outcome if individual i is allocated to the
treatment (control) group. The causal effect of a treatment on individual i is therefore
Yi(1) − Yi(0). The average treatment effect (ATE) is then E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)]. The
CATE, measures the average treatment effect for respondents who share a set of
characteristics. To formalize this definition, suppose that for each individual we collect
J covariates (j = 1, 2...,J), Xi = (Xi1,Xi2, ...,XiJ), with values of the covariates
collected in the set χ. We can then define the CATE for covariate profile x ∈ χ as
θ(x),
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θ(x) = E[Yi(1)−Yi(0)|X = x] (3.6)
A treatment effect is heterogeneous if the value of Equation 3.6 varies as we consider
different strata of participants. As with ATE, random assignment to treatment con-
ditions is sufficient to identify the CATE. To elaborate, the CATE is identified under
unconfoundedness, i.e. Yi(1),Yi(0) ⊥ Ti|Xi , and overlap, i.e. 0 < Pr(Ti = 1|Xi = x) <
1∀x, where Ti denotes the treatment indicator variable.
A CATE estimate can be obtained from a linear model by including interactions
between the treatment indicators and the conditioning variable(s) of interest. The
inclusion of interaction terms in a linear model is a common technique for exploring
the heterogeneity of treatment effects in areas ranging from biomedical science to
the social sciences. However, since we have no clear a priori hypotheses about the
direction of CATEs for different groups, we explore advances in machine learning
to learn these effects instead of reporting results from OLS estimation. We make
use of the doubly robust estimator proposed by Foster and Syrgkanis (2019) and
others.5 This approach flexibly applies machine learning models to create individual
level estimates of treatment effects. These estimates can then be projected onto the
space of covariates for which we wish to model heterogeneity (while marginalising
over all other covariates).
The problem is essentially reduced to the following tasks:
1. predicting the outcome from the treatment and controls
2. predicting the treatment from the controls
5Other recent methods to explore heterogeneity such as the causal forest proposed by Wager
and Athey (2018) or the BLP method proposed by Chernozhukov et al. (2017) are infeasible in
our setting because of our large sample size. These methods are better suited to ‘large p small n’
problems, wherein the number of observations are small relative to the number of covariates and
their interactions. In fact, almost all empirical applications of these methods that we have come
across deal with sample sizes of less than 1 million.
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3. combining these two predictive models in a final stage estimation so as to create
a model of the heterogeneous treatment effect.
The approach allows for arbitrary machine learning algorithms to be used for the
two predictive tasks, while maintaining many favorable statistical properties related
to the final model (e.g. small mean squared error, asymptotic normality, construction
of confidence intervals). The latter favorable statistical properties hold if either the
first or the second of the two predictive tasks achieves small mean squared error
(hence the name doubly robust).
The final stage regression estimated through this method is meaningful even if the
space of functions over which we minimize the final regression loss does not contain
the true CATE function. In that case, the method will estimate the projection of the
CATE function onto the space of models over which we optimize in the final regression.
For instance, this allows one to perform inference on the best linear projection of the
CATE function or to perform inference on the best CATE function on a subset of
features that could potentially be creating heterogeneity, without making any further
assumptions on how that heterogeneity looks like (Foster and Syrgkanis, 2019). For
implementational details, please refer to Section B.1.
In summary, this procedure yields individual level treatment effect estimates which
can be projected onto different sets of covariates to provide estimates of CATEs (while
controlling for baseline differences across all other covariates). First, we estimate a
projection of the CATEs onto a constant. This is akin to estimating the ATE from
the individual treatment effect estimates. Comparing these estimates with the OLS
estimates in Table 3.4, we find very consistent results, thus lending some credibility
to our estimate of individual level effects (Figure 3·7).
Next, we project these estimates, in turn, onto our pre-treatment covariates. We
don’t find evidence of very large heterogeneous effects - across various covariates,
79
effects continue to be negative and not very different from each other. We feel that
this ‘null result’ is also relevant from a policy perspective, since it indicates that based
on the given covariates, we don’t observe consistently positive and significant effects
for any user group which would justify rolling out the high floor price treatment to
that group. Nonetheless, we report results from the two sets of covariates (acquisition
channel and price level) that yielded the most interesting patterns (other results are
available in Section B.2):
1. Users exposed to more expensive listings tend to click out less in treatment
(-0.04) relative to those exposed to less expensive listings (-0.015). This is in-
teresting because we would expect users searching for more expensive listings
to be less price sensitive and thus less affected by higher displayed prices (Fig-
ure 3·8).
2. Users searching for less expensive listings (lower price levels) have a significantly
lower propensity to book, as well as reduced booking value in treatment. On the
other hand, users searching for more expensive listings reduce their engagement
(time on site, number of searches) more in treatment relative to the former
group. This indicates that higher floor prices might have differential negative
effects across consumers of different price sensitivities, but does not have a
positive and significant impact on any group (Figure 3·8).
3. Users acquired via organic Google search and Facebook tend to exhibit some
positive effects - in particular, these users spend significantly more time on
the website. Facebook users also tend to have a higher propensity to book
and higher spending. Although the 95% confidence interval overlaps 0, these
estimates are more precisely estimated than those of the other categories (Fig-
ure 3·9). Unfortunately we do not have enough data to investigate this further,
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but it does provide preliminary evidence that acquisition channel might have
an effect on user perceptions of floor prices. Future work can aim to investigate
this effect in greater detail.
3.6 Conclusion
Advertised reference prices (ARPs) are an important tool with which firms can cal-
ibrate the price expectations of consumers. ARPs have been shown to have an impact
on consumer evaluations and purchase behavior in a variety of domains. However,
most previous applications have looked at ARPs that are framed as discounts and
serve to emphasize transaction utility. In this paper, we experimentally explore a
relatively understudied variant of ARPs, namely the “Starting from” (floor) price
commonly displayed by vacation rental platforms. Using results from two large-scale
field experiments conducted on Holidu.com, we find that higher floor prices tend to
decrease engagement metrics at all levels of the purchase funnel: namely, they lead to
fewer outbound clicks, fewer searches as well as lesser time spent on the website. We
also find noisy but suggestive evidence of a negative effect on booking level outcomes
such as the propensity to book as well as the total booking amount.
Our findings are supportive of how firms can benefit (at least in the short term)
by engaging in price obfuscation and reducing salience. This view is consistent with
several recent papers examining price salience in digital markets (most notably Blake
et al. (2018)). However, they seemingly contradict the sticker shock theory, which
posits that consumers react adversely if there is a large discrepancy between expected
and true prices. Although raising floor prices amounts to reducing this discrepancy,
consumers react adversely even when they are exposed to true (i.e dated) prices on the
platform. Finally, we check for treatment effect heterogeneity and do not find large
heterogeneity in these effects. Nevertheless, we find some evidence that the channel
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of acquisition and the general price levels of the listings searched for can have some
differential effects on outcomes. In particular, we find that users searching for more
expensive listings reduce their clicks the most when faced with higher floor prices,
whereas users searching for cheaper listings tend to exhibit a greater negative effect on
booking level outcomes. In addition, users acquired through Facebook tend to spend
more time on the website, and also exhibit greater booking rates and spending when
exposed to higher floor prices. We do not have enough data to clearly delineate the
underlying mechanism for these observations, but they open up interesting avenues
for future research.
Our results suggest that, in a bid to provide more accurate and transparent price
estimates, firms may implicitly end up adversely affecting engagement outcomes. It is
thus worth carefully considering how these transparency signals may be conveyed in
an online environment where users have limited attention. Our data from Holidu.com
encompasses users searching for accommodation from across the globe, and can thus
generalize to other global vacation rental or aggregation platforms. That being said,
the extent of the effect as well as other moderating factors are all empirical questions
worth examining on different platforms and domains. In particular, online market-
places exhibit many other forms of less conventional ARPs. We have focused our
attention to floor prices, but average prices and price ranges are also commonly seen.
It is worth examining in the future how these signals might affect consumer percep-
tions.
Another limitation of our study is that we have manipulated prices only by 10%.
It is thus worth understanding what the limits are to the effects we observe. Per-
haps one moderating factor could be whether the prices are believable (as shown by
Ngwe (2018)), and low floor prices continue to attract consumers as long as they are
not unrealistically low ("Starting from $1"). The optimal ‘threshold’ is an empirical
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question to investigate in future work.
Finally, we do not study long term effects. It would be worth tracking the same
users over time to see if repeated exposure to low (vs high) floor prices has an effect.
The ability to track users long term would also enable the collection of more covariates
that can enrich the heterogeneity analysis described above. Unfortunately this is
infeasible in our current setting since the majority of users are one-off and do not
have an account with the website.
On the surface, our findings indicate that consumers do not value accurate or
transparent prices, which is somewhat surprising. However, part of the effect may
arise from how floor price information is presented to consumers. One possible mech-
anism to ‘debias’ consumer perceptions could perhaps be displaying all prices on a
calendar, rather than providing dated prices only on request. This takes into account
consumer inattention by making the difference between floor prices and dated prices
more direct, while also promoting greater price transparency. As an initial test of this
hypothesis, we examined the effect of floor price changes on Airbnb.com using data
collected in 2014-2015 (described in Section B.3). At the time, users could see prices
for every calendar date (like Google Flights) along with a ‘From’ price displayed at
the top, hence arguably, comparisons between actual and floor prices could easily be
made. Interestingly, this data indicates (1) a positive correlation between outcomes
and floor price levels, and (2) a negative correlation between outcomes and the wedge.
Hence, these results lean towards supporting the sticker shock hypothesis. However,
given the observational nature of this data and the lack of a credible exogenous shock
in floor prices, this is preliminary evidence that should be experimentally investigated.
Our study is among the first to study ARPs using field experiments that explic-
itly manipulate displayed prices. Doing so, we capture how floor prices affect user
engagement on a large vacation rental platform and provide policy-relevant findings
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that can benefit platforms and consumers.
3.7 Tables
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of our main outcomes of interest.
Num. users Mean Std Max Min
Number of searches 6,385,717 3.340 6.209 1,031 0
Outbounds 6,385,717 2.028 4.809 537 0
Dated searches 6,385,717 2.330 4.923 857 0
Booked 6,385,717 0.005 0.072 1 0
Booking value 6,385,717 4.869 110.091 45,855.750 0
Time on Site (hours) 6,385,717 30.075 113.053 1,157.147 0
Table 3.2: Cramer’s V computed for covariates that had a statistically
significant different in balance checks.
Cramer’s_V Covariate





Table 3.3: The effect of raising floor prices on user-levels outcomes: not including pre-treatment covari-
ates.
Dependent variable:
Outbound Dated Searches All searches Booked BookingValue Time(in hrs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated −0.027∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.0001 −0.052 −0.179∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.0001) (0.087) (0.089)
Constant 2.041∗∗∗ 2.336∗∗∗ 3.345∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 4.895∗∗∗ 30.165∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.00004) (0.062) (0.063)
Pre-treatment covariates No No No No No No
Observations 6,385,717 6,385,717 6,385,717 6,385,717 6,385,717 6,385,717
Adjusted R2 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 −0.00000 0.00000
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.4: The effect of raising floor prices on user-levels outcomes: including pre-treatment covariates.
Dependent variable:
Outbound Dated Searches All searches Booked Booking Value Time (in hrs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated −0.028∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.0001 −0.057 −0.169∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.0001) (0.087) (0.088)
Constant 0.699∗∗∗ 1.772∗∗∗ 2.241∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 2.958∗∗∗ −4.937∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.0002) (0.268) (0.270)
Pre-treatment covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,385,717 6,385,717 6,385,717 6,385,717 6,385,717 6,385,717
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.033 0.037 0.003 0.001 0.036
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.5: The average user-level difference in dated and floor prices










Residual Std. Error 242.218 (df = 3019875)
F Statistic 641.597∗∗∗ (df = 1; 3019875)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.6: The impact of raising floor prices on users who have been exposed to dated prices.
Dependent variable:
Outbound Dated Searches All searches Booked Booking Value Time (in hrs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated −0.017∗∗ −0.013∗ −0.010 −0.0001 −0.005 −0.059
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.0001) (0.170) (0.153)
Constant 1.443∗∗∗ 4.960∗∗∗ 5.594∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 6.076∗∗∗ −7.954∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.094) (0.118) (0.002) (2.292) (2.069)
Pre-treatment covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,041,708 3,041,708 3,041,708 3,041,708 3,041,708 3,041,708
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.034 0.038 0.004 0.002 0.048
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Pre-treatment covariates No Yes
Observations 3,041,708 3,041,708
Adjusted R2 0.00000 0.0001
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.8: The impact of the wedge on outcomes on interest.
Dependent variable:
Outbound Dated Searches All searches Booked Booking Value Time (in hrs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wedge −0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.00000∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00000) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Constant 1.497∗∗∗ 4.856∗∗∗ 5.497∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 5.283∗∗ −7.080∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.094) (0.118) (0.002) (2.290) (2.068)
Pre-treatment covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,041,708 3,041,708 3,041,708 3,041,708 3,041,708 3,041,708
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.035 0.039 0.004 0.002 0.048
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.9: The impact of the wedge on outcomes of interest, instrumented by treatment status.
Dependent variable:
Outbound Dated Searches All searches Bookings Booking Value Time (in hrs) Stage1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Wedge 0.002∗∗ 0.00001 0.003∗∗∗ 0.00000 0.019 0.042∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.00001) (0.021) (0.019)
Treated −8.162∗∗∗
(0.244)
Constant 0.909∗∗∗ 4.709∗∗∗ 4.596∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 3.367 −17.007∗∗∗ 68.454∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.110) (0.137) (0.002) (2.662) (2.412) (3.284)
Pre-treatment covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,041,708 3,041,708 3,041,708 3,041,708 3,041,708 3,041,708 3,041,708
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.033 0.036 0.004 0.002 0.042 0.040
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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3.8 Figures










Perceived J under obfuscation
Perceived J under sticker shock
True choice set J













Figure 3·2: A stylised model to depict the possible impacts of raising floor prices.
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Figure 3·3: Example of experimental manipulation on Holidu.com.
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Figure 3·4: Distribution of pre-treatment covariates across treatment con-
ditions: no significant differences.
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Figure 3·5: Distribution of pre-treatment covariates across treatment con-
ditions: significant differences according to a Chi-Sq. test.
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Figure 3·6: Distribution of pre-treatment covariates across treatment con-
ditions: significant differences according to a Chi-Sq. test.
97
Figure 3·7: Comparison of point estimates and standard errors across
OLS and doubly robust estimates. We find very consistent results.
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Figure 3·8: Treatment effect heterogeneity across price levels.
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In my PhD research, I try to understand how consumers respond to different
product page “cues” that they are exposed to in an online setting, and how these
cues might eventually affect the profitability of the platform. To causally identify the
effects I estimate, I use an experimental/quasi-experimental framework along with
tools from empirical econometrics as well as machine learning.
This research has direct implications for the design choices made by online plat-
forms. In particular, I show that (1) the design choice of including consumer-
contributed Q&As can reduce frictions in the matching process of consumers with
products and thus lead to higher satisfaction, and (2) not anticipating consumer
responses to salient prices can have a detrimental effect on consumer engagement
metrics. Building on these ideas, future research can further examine the optimal use
and limits of such design choices. My particular setting explores a subset of empir-
ical applications but it will be worthwhile to further investigate the overall welfare
implications of these choices.
My research agenda going forward is to continue exploring (1) the appropriate
tools that firms can leverage to help consumers make better purchase decisions online;
(2) the design of reputation systems, their inherent biases, as well as how they differ
based on the type of platform and product; (3) advances in causal machine learning
and large scale text analysis/natural language processing that are applicable to the
problems described above.
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To this end, in ongoing projects that emerge from my dissertation research, I
am exploring other related aspects of online decision making. In one project, I am
examining specific assumptions made by consumers when they submit a product
rating online, and how a simulated generative model can be used to incorporate
those assumptions and back out specific “costs” of leaving a review. In particular,
we propose a likelihood free inference engine using neural networks (adapted from
Tejero-Cantero et al. (2020)) that can infer these costs in a reliable and scalable
way. Our model takes only the histogram of observed reviews as input, and therefore
can be used to model correlations of inferred cost parameters with various product
features. As a preliminary proof of concept, we apply the model to a dataset of 450,000
product reviews of 939 products submitted on Amazon.com. We find that the cost
to leaving a negative review is much greater than a positive review (Figure 4·1), and
this cost is further correlated with price, brand, and the number of reviews a product
has. Gaining a better understanding of the dynamics of reputation systems, namely,
the conditions under which ratings are submitted, is crucial for marketers, brand
managers, and designers of digital platforms, who can leverage this information to
stimulate further reviews and better manage user generated content.
In a second project, I am focusing my attention on Goodreads.com, a major web-
site for book reviews. Goodreads also allows consumer Q&As, and I am currently
trying to understand how the role played by Q&As in this setting might differ from
that proposed in Chapter 2. Initial results from roughly 63,000 books indicate that
Q&As contain a mix of subjective (age appropriateness of a certain book) and ob-
jective (where to find a copy) information (Figure 4·2). Further, there is interesting
heterogeneity in the kinds of genres that attract a question - for example, young adult,
audiobooks and thrillers have a larger proportion of books with at least one question
than non-fiction or food and drink (Figure 4·3). We did not specifically explore why
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Figure 4·1: The ‘cost’ of leaving a review formulated as a threshold ρ.
Our generative model simulates several histograms with different values of
ρ+ and ρ− - the values here indicate the mean posterior ρ values computed
across 939 products on Amazon.com.
certain kinds of products might get questions in Chapter 2, so this research can serve
as an interesting complement to our existing results.
In the future, I also want to find more applications of machine learning to enrich
causal inference. I started using machine learning to create interesting covariates
(like vector representations of text, or new categorical variables) that can then enter
regression models and lend more richness and interpretability to estimation. In ad-
dition to such applications, I have recently begun to explore several “causal machine
learning” tools, which are particularly useful for high dimensional causal analysis. I
use one such example (doubly robust inference for heterogeneous treatment effects) in
Chapter 3. Causal ML is a burgeoning area that will likely form the foundations for
much of causal inference in the years to come, and I hope to find more applications
for these tools in my current and future projects. As digitization continues to exert
an all-encompassing influence on buyers, sellers and societies alike, it is important
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Figure 4·2: Proportion across documents and topic-specific importance of
keywords for the top 4 topics obtained by training an LDA topic model on
question text across 63,000 books on Goodreads.com.
to continue examining various aspects of the digital revolution and how it impacts
stakeholders at large.
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Figure 4·3: The proportion of books within the top 30 genres that receive




Interacting User Generated Content
Technologies: How Questions and
Answers Affect Consumer Reviews
A.1 Tables and Figures
Table A.1: LDA topics extracted from the Q&A corpus.
Topic Highest Probability Words
Dimensions height width depth dimensions length size
Guarantee/warranty buy bought guarantee product warranty year
Compatibility (computers) ipod compatible laptop windows work download
Dimensions (furniture) 1 fit sofa flat size item dimensions
Attributes (kitchen appliance) oven grill light switch time microwave
Dimensions (furniture) 2 door side drawers left doors open
Attributes (furniture) weight table chair chairs back seat
Installation queries (kitchen) cooker gas included installation electric include
Compatibility (phone) phone card sim work memory phones
Compatibility (home appliance) box work connect record freeview internet
Attributes (lamps) glass light pole lid lamp plastic
Attributes (power socket) cable usb plug battery socket power
Attributes (entertainment system) work player dvd play remote samsung
Dimensions (bed) bed mattress size fit base double
Queries (home appliance) fridge freezer free dryer long wash
Dimension (furniture) 3 wall unit shelves shelf top fit
Instructions (camera/printer) camera printer print clock ink set
Description discrepancies product description confirm question correct states
Color/finish (furniture) colour made white black wood match
Attributes (home appliance) machine water washing make hot filter
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Table A.2: LDA topics extracted from the review corpus.
Topic Highest Probability Words
Quality (vacuum) easy great good cleaner clean product
Quality (electronics) sound good great clock quality set
Quality (phone/camera) phone easy set good camera features
Quality (home appliance) kettle water good iron machine toaster
Quality (bedclothes) bed duvet comfortable warm mattress pillows
Value for money 1 good job easy product money price
Product instructions put instructions wall screws holes fit
Product returns store item product service delivery back
Replacement bought years printer replace buy good
Gifts bought great room son loves year
Quality (clothes line) put clothes easy good cover sturdy
Dimensions (storage unit) storage easy small space put unit
Value for money 2 product money great good recommend excellent
Value for money (negative) it’s bit reviews price cheap buy
Quality (garden tools) good job cut light easy small mower
Discounts price good quality great bargain sale
Quality (lighting) light colour nice lovely lamp room
Assembly instructions easy good put table assemble money
Quality (kitchen appliance) easy clean great cooker microwave food
Quality (poor) quality bin back poor plastic cheap







POST × Low Rating −0.037
(0.033)
POST × High Variance 0.020
(0.037)
POST × Fit −0.157
(0.105)
POST 0.089∗ 0.074 0.085∗
(0.050) (0.054) (0.047)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 37,863 37,863 37,863
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the product level.
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POST × Low Rating 0.318
(0.468)
POST × High Variance 0.607
(0.479)
POST × Fit 0.710
(0.930)
POST −0.424 −0.506 −0.349
(0.410) (0.408) (0.349)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,209 20,209 20,209
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01





(a) Yelp. (b) Google reviews.
(c) TripAdvisor. (d) Amazon.
Figure A·1: Q&A technology on di!erent platforms.
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Figure A·2: Screenshot of survey shown to workers on MTurk.
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Table A.5: Examples of reviews indicating fit and quality issues.
Fit issues Quality issues
1. What a waste of money. I bought it
specifically because I had a friend coming
and it is much too small for an adult to
sleep on and barely big enough for a child.
Absolutely useless. (3 stars)
1. I suppose it’s true that you get what
you pay for. It’s light and compact, no
problem to set up, but the sound quality
is very poor. I call it Tin Lizzie. (2 stars)
2. Bought for an occasional put-u-up for
the grandchild on sleep over - suitable for
small child, folding away to make a con-
venient bed chair. NOT SUITABLE FOR
10+. As it’s close to the ground and con-
tains no metal or sharp pieces, the child
cannot hurt itself if rolls out of bed!! For
what it is could be a lower price. (3 stars)
2. Disappointed to say the least. The
beads were not aligned and the bar at the
top is just a strip of cheap wood that is
bent. (1 star)
3. The lead works great on some tom-
toms with the larger USB connector but
the adapter supplied doesn’t work on the
smaller USB connector. Have tried an-
other connector, still no luck, so lead stuck
in drawer now!!!! (1 star)
3. Both the store manager and I tried to
fit the case, on the date of purchase (it was
the appropriate design for my iPod), but
the two halves did not fit together. The
case was flimsy too, so I don’t know how
much protection it would have afforded
my device anyway. I received my money
back there and then. (1 star)
4. this item is CREAM & black (NOT
white & black)we ordered this online & it
was indeed very comfortable & well made.
However, it was cream & black in colour,
so we returned it and had a look at an-
other in the store that was exactly the
same. The manager said he would feed
the colour problem back to head office.
We will look elsewhere for a black & white
beanbag !so - in summary - if you are af-
ter a CREAM and black football bean bag
then you would be very happy with this
product. (2 stars)
4. My son used these twice then they
stopped working properly. (1 star)
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Table A.6: LDA topics extracted from the Q&A corpus.
Topic Highest Probability Words
Dimensions height width depth dimensions length size
Guarantee/warranty buy bought guarantee product warranty year
Compatibility (computers) ipod compatible laptop windows work download
Dimensions (furniture) 1 fit sofa flat size item dimensions
Attributes (kitchen appliance) oven grill light switch time microwave
Dimensions (furniture) 2 door side drawers left doors open
Attributes (furniture) weight table chair chairs back seat
Installation queries (kitchen) cooker gas included installation electric include
Compatibility (phone) phone card sim work memory phones
Compatibility (home appliance) box work connect record freeview internet
Attributes (lamps) glass light pole lid lamp plastic
Attributes (power socket) cable usb plug battery socket power
Attributes (entertainment system) work player dvd play remote samsung
Dimensions (bed) bed mattress size fit base double
Queries (home appliance) fridge freezer free dryer long wash
Dimension (furniture) 3 wall unit shelves shelf top fit
Instructions (camera/printer) camera printer print clock ink set
Description discrepancies product description confirm question correct states
Color/finish (furniture) colour made white black wood match
Attributes (home appliance) machine water washing make hot filter
Table A.7: LDA topics extracted from the review corpus.
Topic Highest Probability Words
Quality (vacuum) easy great good cleaner clean product
Quality (electronics) sound good great clock quality set
Quality (phone/camera) phone easy set good camera features
Quality (home appliance) kettle water good iron machine toaster
Quality (bedclothes) bed duvet comfortable warm mattress pillows
Value for money 1 good job easy product money price
Product instructions put instructions wall screws holes fit
Product returns store item product service delivery back
Replacement bought years printer replace buy good
Gifts bought great room son loves year
Quality (clothes line) put clothes easy good cover sturdy
Dimensions (storage unit) storage easy small space put unit
Value for money 2 product money great good recommend excellent
Value for money (negative) it’s bit reviews price cheap buy
Quality (garden tools) good job cut light easy small mower
Discounts price good quality great bargain sale
Quality (lighting) light colour nice lovely lamp room
Assembly instructions easy good put table assemble money
Quality (kitchen appliance) easy clean great cooker microwave food
Quality (poor) quality bin back poor plastic cheap
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Table A.8: Flexible definition of holdout: The impact of Q&A on ratings using low pre-treatment ratings






(1st stage) IV IV (bins)
POST × Low Rating 0.243∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.027) (0.036)
POST × Hold-out Rating −0.918∗∗∗
(0.025)
POST −0.045∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗ 4.121∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.110) (0.011)
POST × Rating ∈ [2,3] 0.557∗∗∗
(0.107)
POST × Rating ∈ (3,4] 0.128∗∗∗
(0.031)
POST × Rating ∈ (4,5] −0.018∗
(0.011)
Review Rank 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0001∗ −0.0001∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00005) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F Statistic 455.98
Observations 345,168 225,182 225,182 225,182 225,182
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the product level.
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Table A.9: Flexible definition of holdout: The impact of Q&A on ratings using high pre-treatment rating







POST × High Variance 0.157∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.025)
POST × Hold-out Variance 0.611∗∗∗
(0.012)
POST −0.060∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013)
Review Rank 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗ 0.00001 0.0001
(0.00004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
F Statistic 823.99
Observations 345,168 225,182 225,182 225,182
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the product level.
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Table A.10: Flexible definition of holdout: The impact of Q&A on
ratings using the pre-treatment fraction of review mentioning fit issues







POST × Fit 1.933∗∗∗ 1.940∗∗∗ 1.722∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.264) (0.348)
POST × Hold-out Fit 1.440∗∗∗
(0.041)
POST −0.039∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.001) (0.012)
Review Rank 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗ −0.00000∗ 0.0001∗∗
(0.00005) (0.0001) (0.00000) (0.0001)
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
F Statistic 418.86
Observations 345,168 225,182 225,182 225,182
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the product level.
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Table A.11: LDA topics extracted from the pre-Q&A reviews.
Topic Highest Probability Words
Furniture 1 table seat present glad black
Value for money 1 excellent money value good product
Quality 1 set feature delight read pretty
Phone recommend sound phone work highly
Value for money 2 good great easy look price
Replacement old year bought replace purchase
Storage small easy fit space storage
Furniture 2 bed comfort chair bought mattress
Accessories design star rang push piece
Returns return better connect review work
Usage easy use said work simple
Holidays iron lid bag bin christmas
Quality 2 light look love colour nice
Furniture 2 price love table great bought
Kitchen appliance use heat water cook kettle
Household appliance use clean floor cleaner vacuum
Instructions instruct wall screw bit drill
Outdoor equipment machine product price garden
Clocks clock keep cheap time real
Furniture 3 cover door easy plenty heavy
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A.2 Mathematical Appendix
In this appendix we present a stylized model that captures the essence of how the
presence of informative Q&A affects consumer decision making and product ratings
in settings with consumer fit uncertainty.
Consumer Side. We begin by modeling the consumer side. Understanding how
the presence of Q&A affects consumer behavior is essential in order to understand
the impact of Q&A on average product ratings.
A focal consumer contemplates whether to purchase a product. The consumer
possesses perfect knowledge about every attribute of the product, except one. The
unknown attribute can take one of two values, a “good” value resulting in positive
product utility g and a “bad” value resulting in negative utility −b (g,b ≥ 0). Both
utilities g,b include the disutility of price. All utilities, as well as the definition of
what is “good” and “bad”, might differ from one consumer to the next. Therefore,
our model is general enough to encompass both quality and fit-related attributes.
In the latter case, “good” and “bad” have subjective interpretations. For example,
“good (bad)” might mean “the dimensions of this product fit (do not fit) through my
apartment’s door” or “the lens is (is not) compatible with my camera.”
Let us denote by α the prior probability that the unknown attribute will take the
“bad” value; α is thus the probability of “bad fit” or fit mismatch. In the absence
of any additional information, the consumer’s expected utility is g − α(g + b). The
consumer purchases if and only if g −α(g + b) > 0 or, equivalently, if α < g/(g + b). If
the consumer purchases, with probability α she experiences negative post-purchase
utility, i.e. regrets the purchase. We assume that if the consumer experiences posi-
tive (negative) post-purchase utility she posts a positive (negative) product review.
Assuming that a positive review is equivalent to a rating of “1” and a negative review
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equivalent to a rating of “0”, the average product rating is equal to one minus the
average probability of post-purchase regret among its purchasers.1
Let us now assume that the consumer asks a question about the value of the
unknown attribute (by posting a question at a Q&A forum) and receives back an
answer. The answer can be positive, meaning “the attribute is good” or negative,
meaning, “the attribute is bad”. We assume that the answer is correct with probability
p ≥ 12 . Thus, p denotes the quality of information. Denote by π+,π− the posterior
probabilities that the unknown attribute has the “bad” value given positive (+) or













It is easy to show that:
• π+ is monotonically decreasing with p and ranges from α (for p =
1
2) to 0 (for
p = 1)
• π− is monotonically increasing with p and ranges from α (for p =
1
2) to 1 (for
p = 1)
• π+ ≤ α ≤ π− for all p ≥
1
2
The consumer’s expected utility from purchase, given answer s ∈ {+,−}, is equal to:
us = (1−πs)g +(πs)(−b) = g −πs(g + b)
1The model can be extended to a multi-valued rating scale 1,2, ...,n by defining a correspondence
between post-purchase utilities u1,u2, ...,un−1, where ui < ui+1, such that consumers post rating i
if they experience post-purchase utility ui−1 < u ≤ ui plus the obvious corner cases. The precise
thresholds ui may differ among consumers. Such a mapping retains the key properties that drive
our stylized model, i.e. average ratings are positively related to average post-purchase utility and
negatively related to the probability of fit mismatch among purchasers.
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The consumer purchases if and only if us > 0. There are two cases:
Case I: (Optimistic consumers) g − α(g + b) > 0, or equivalently α < g/(g + b). In this
case the consumer would always purchase the product on the basis of her prior
beliefs. If we add the option of asking questions, the consumer purchases the
product if either: 1) she receives a positive answer of any informativeness, or 2)
she receives a negative answer of low informativeness, such that her posterior
beliefs remain close to the prior. However, she does not purchase the product if
she receives a negative answer whose informativeness p is sufficiently high, such
that π− ≥ g/(g + b). The consumer’s probability of regret conditional on pur-
chase, is equal to α if there is no Q&A or if there is Q&A, as long as the answer’s
informativeness remains relatively low. The probability of regret, conditional
on purchase, decreases to π+ (recall that π+ ≤ α) as soon as the answer’s infor-
mativeness p crosses the threshold above which the consumer buys only if she
receives a positive answer; π+ is a declining function of p and converges to zero
as p tends towards 1, i.e. as answers to questions become perfectly reliable. In
that limiting case, consumers who choose to purchase in the presence of Q&A
never experience fit mismatch and post only positive ratings.
Case II: (Pessimistic consumers) g − α(g + b) ≤ 0, or equivalently α ≥ g/(g + b). In this
case, the consumer would not purchase the product on the basis of her prior be-
liefs. If we add the option of asking questions, the consumer only purchases the
product if she receives a positive answer whose informativeness p is sufficiently
high, such that π+ ≤ g/(g + b). If the consumer purchases, the probability of
post-purchase regret is π+; as above, the probability of regret goes to zero in
the limiting case of perfectly reliable answers.
The conditions that determine whether Case I or Case II applies depend on both
α and the ratio g/(g + b). Case I applies when either α is small or g/(g + b) is large.
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Case II applies when α is large or g/(g + b) is small. The ratio g/(g + b) captures
the relationship between the utility of a match g and the disutility of a mismatch
b. In settings where the consequences of a mismatch are not very severe (e.g. when
product prices are low and/or products are easy to return), b is likely to be small
and g/(g +b) large. Conversely, in settings where the consequences of a mismatch are
more severe (e.g. high prices, difficult to return products, bad fit causes damage to
property or health) b is likely to be large and g/(g + b) small.
In summary:
1. The presence of Q&A affects consumer decision making only if answers are
sufficiently informative (i.e. if p is sufficiently high).
2. The ability to ask a question and receive a sufficiently informative answer about
an unknown fit-related product feature has the following effect on consumer
decision making:
(a) In settings where the prior probability of bad fit is low or the consequences
of fit mismatch not severe (Case I), it discourages consumers who would
otherwise be making a mistake from purchasing the product if the answer
indicates that the product may not be a good fit for them.
(b) In settings where the prior probability of bad fit is high or the consequences
of fit mismatch severe (Case II), it encourages consumers who would oth-
erwise be reluctant to purchase the product if the answer indicates that
the product may be a good fit for them.
Observe that, in our model, average consumer utility and average ratings are linear
transformations of one another. Specifically, average consumer utility u = g −π(g +b)
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Product Side. We now turn our attention to the product side. For any given
product, we assume that there are multiple prospective consumers. We, further,
assume that a fraction 1−ǫ of consumers (we will call them the “informed” consumers)
have perfect information about the product and purchase it, knowing that it serves
their needs. These consumers always post positive reviews. The remaining consumers
behave like the focal consumer we analyzed above. We will call those consumers the
“uninformed” consumers.
Each uninformed consumer may care about different unknown attributes and may
have different notions of what constitutes “good” and “bad” states of those attributes.
On aggregate, we assume that the focal product is a bad ex-post fit for a fraction ω of
uninformed consumers and a good fit for the rest. However, uninformed consumers
do not have precise fit information ex-ante and, as discussed above, make decisions
assuming a prior probability of bad fit equal to α.
Note that there is no inconsistency in assuming different values for α and ω.
Whereas the value of α reflects the distribution of product attributes on the market,
ω reflects the distribution of consumer tastes for those attributes. For example,
consider the case of portable hard drives that can be compatible with PC only or
Mac only. Assume that 70% of portable hard drives on the market are compatible
with PC only and 30% compatible with Mac only. If the drive’s compatibility is the
unknown attribute, a PC user would be justified in assuming α = 0.3 whereas a Mac
user would be justified in assuming α = 0.7. Assume, now, that 90% of consumers
are PC users and 10% are Mac users. A PC-compatible hard drive is, thus, a bad fit
for a fraction ω = 0.1 of consumers, whereas a Mac-compatible hard drive is a bad fit
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for a fraction ω = 0.9.
Under the above assumptions, and assuming that Q&A is informative enough (i.e.
that p is sufficiently high) to affect consumer behavior:
1. If α < g/(g + b), such that Case I applies:
(a) Without Q&A, all uninformed consumers purchase. A fraction ω will ex-
perience bad fit and will post negative reviews. The average ratings of
uninformed consumers will then be 1 − ω and the average ratings of all
consumers (informed plus uninformed) 1− ǫ+ ǫ(1−ω).
(b) With Q&A, with probability p a fraction ω of uninformed consumers (the
fraction for whom the product is a bad fit) will receive a (correct) negative
answer and will not purchase. With probability 1 − p that same fraction
will receive a (wrong) positive answer and will purchase, resulting in bad
fit and negative reviews. With probability p the remaining fraction (the
fraction for whom the product is a good fit) will receive a (correct) positive
answer and will purchase, resulting in positive reviews. With probability
1 − p that same fraction will receive a (wrong) negative answer and will
not purchase. The average ratings of uninformed consumers will thus be
p(1 − ω)/[(1 − p)ω + p(1 − ω)] and the average ratings of all consumers
(1− ǫ+ ǫp(1−ω))/[1− ǫ+ ǫ((1−p)ω +p(1−ω))].
2. If α ≥ g/(g + b), such that Case II applies.
(a) Without Q&A, no uninformed consumers purchase. Informed consumers
always post positive ratings, therefore, the average product ratings will be
1.
(b) With Q&A, the effect will be identical to case 1(b) above.
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Without loss of generality, we assume that a fraction γ of uninformed consumers have
prior beliefs α such that Case I applies and the rest have prior beliefs such that Case
II applies. Then, combining Cases 1 and 2 above, we conclude that:
• Without Q&A (Cases 1(a) and 2(a)), the average rating of the product will be
(1 − ǫ + ǫγ(1 − ω))/(1 − ǫ + ǫγ). Using elementary comparative statics we can
show that this is a decreasing function of ǫ, ω and γ, that is, ratings are lower
when:
1. there are many uninformed consumers (high ǫ), that is, the product ex-
hibits a higher fit uncertainty, and
2. the product is a bad fit for a large fraction of consumers (high ω), that is,
the product caters to niche tastes that do not coincide with the mainstream
2, and
3. many uninformed consumers are optimistic about the probability of a good
fit and choose to purchase in the presence of fit uncertainty (high γ); as
previously discussed, this happens when most products of this category
are a good fit for most consumers (such that most consumers have a low
α) and/or when then impact of bad fit is not very severe relative to the
utility of a good fit.
• An interesting nuance of this result is that high average ratings may indicate
one or more of the following conditions:
1. there exist few uninformed consumers (low ǫ)
2. the product is a good fit for a lot of consumers (low ω)
2Assuming that most computer users are PC users, an external hard drive that is only compatible
with Apple computers would be an example of such a niche product.
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3. most uninformed consumers are pessimistic and choose to not purchase;
as previously discussed, this happens when the probability of fit mismatch
is high for this product category (high α) and/or the impact of bad fit is
severe relative to the utility of a good fit
• With sufficiently informative Q&A (Cases 1(b) and 2(b)), γ does not matter
and the average rating of the product will be (1− ǫ + ǫp(1 − ω))/[1 − ǫ + ǫ((1 −
p)ω + p(1 − ω))]. Using elementary comparative statics we can show that this
is an increasing function of p and a decreasing function of ǫ and ω. Average
ratings are higher, the higher the informativeness of Q&A and the lower the
fraction of 1) uninformed consumers and 2) consumers for which the product is
not a good fit.
The crispest intuitions are obtained when Q&A answers are always correct (p = 1).
Average ratings with Q&A are then equal to 1 for all ω, since consumers become
perfectly informed and purchase if and only if the product is a good fit for them. The
ratings increase due to Q&A is then simply 1−(Ratings without Q&A)= ǫγω/(1− ǫ+
ǫγ).3 The latter is an increasing function of ǫ, ω and γ. The ratings increase is also
inversely proportional to the ratings without Q&A, i.e. the lower these ratings, the
higher the increase.
To reiterate, the positive impact of Q&A on average ratings of individual products
is highest for products that
1. exhibit fit uncertainty for many consumers, and
2. are not a good fit for many consumers, and
3. belong to product categories where many uninformed consumers are optimistic
about the probability of a good fit and choose to purchase in the presence of fit
3This expression roughly corresponds to mj in our empirical model.
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uncertainty; as previously discussed, this happens when most products of this
category are a good fit for most consumers and/or when the impact of bad fit
is not very severe relative to the utility of a good fit.
When p < 1 the ratings increase due to Q&A is generally lower and may even
become negative in settings where γ is close to 0. Such settings are characterized by
pessimistic uninformed consumers who have very unfavorable priors about product
fit or are faced with severe consequences of fit mismatch (i.e. fall in Case II of the
consumer model). In the absence of Q&A, pessimistic uninformed consumers do not
purchase; only informed consumers purchase and post positive ratings. The presence
of Q&A may convince uninformed consumers to purchase if they receive a positive
answer. However, because this answer may be wrong with some probability, some
uninformed purchasers will experience bad fit and will post negative ratings, thus
lowering the (previously perfect) average. In the paper we assume that p is sufficiently
close to one (and/or γ sufficiently high) for such effects to not occur. Our empirical
analyses are consistent with these assumptions; we find no statistically significant




B.1 Doubly Robust Estimation of Heterogeneous Treatment
Effects
The Doubly Robust approach flexibly applies machine learning models to create
individual level estimates of treatment effects. Resultantly, these estimates can then
be projected onto the space of covariates for which we wish to model heterogeneity
(while marginalising over all other covariates). All analysis was conducted using the
EconML package developed by Microsoft Research.1
We assume that:
Y (t) = gt(X,W )+ ǫt, E[ǫ | X,W ] = 0
Y (t) ⊥ T | X,W
(B.1)
Hence, modifying Equation B.1 we have:
θ(x) = E[Yi(1)−Yi(0)|X] = E[g1(X,W )−g0(X,W )|X] (B.2)
One way to estimate θ(x) is the Direct Method (DM) approach, where we compute
Yi(DM) as Y
DM
i,t = gt (Xi,Wi) − g0 (Xi,Wi). The task then amounts to estimating
g(X,W ) using machine learning methods and then evaluating θ(X) by regressing
Y DMi,t on X. The main problem with this approach is that it is heavily dependent on




An alternative approach that does not suffer from the aforementioned problems is
the Inverse Propensity Score (IPS) approach. This method starts from the realization
that, due to the unconfoundedness assumption, we can create an unbiased estimate
of every potential outcome by re-weighting each sample by the inverse probability
of that sample receiving the treatment we observed (i.e. up-weighting samples that
have “surprising” treatment assignments).
Y IP Si,t =
Yi1{Ti = t}





Then it holds that
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Thus we can estimate a θ(X) by regressing Y IP Si,t − Y
IP S
i,0 on X. The drawback
with this approach is that it has high variance, since we are dividing the observation
by a relatively small probability (especially if in some regions of X,W some treatments
are unlikely).
The Doubly Robust approach avoids the above drawbacks by combining the two
methods. In particular, it fits a direct regression model, but then debiases that
model by applying an Inverse Propensity approach to the residual of that model. It
constructs the following estimates of the potential outcomes:
Y DRi,t = gt (Xi,Wi)+
Yi −gt (Xi,Wi)
pt (Xi,Wi)
·1{Ti = t} (B.5)




This yields the overall algorithm:
1. Learn a ‘regression model’ gt(X,W ), by running a regression of Yi on Ti,Xi,Wi
2. Learn a ‘propensity model’ pt(X,W ), by running a classification to predict Ti
from Xi,Wi
3. Construct the doubly robust random variables as described above and regress
them on suitable Xis to explore heterogeneity.
We apply the DR algorithm by using a Lasso as the first stage model, and a
logistic regression as the propensity model. In both case, all available pre-treatment
covariates enter as predictors. Estimation is performed in a cross-fitting way (i.e,
the sample used to fit the predictive models is decoupled from the samples used
in the final regression, as suggested by e.g Chernozhukov et al. (2018); Athey and
Wager (2021))2. We also perform 3-fold cross validation for parameter tuning. After
obtaining individual level treatment effect estimates in line with Equation B.5 for
each i, we can then project these onto different sets of covariates to provide estimates
of CATEs.
2Cross-fitting means that gt(Xi,Wi) is estimated without using individual i’s own data in the
training process. We can split data randomly into n folds - then gt(Xi,Wi) for individuals in a given
fold is trained only using data from the other n − 1 folds. This reduces over-fitting and improves
efficiency. We use n = 3 in our estimation.
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B.2 CATE estimates: doubly robust








B.3 Some correlational evidence from Airbnb
As a follow up to our experimental results, here we provide some results using
floor prices on Airbnb.com. In particular, this data gives us an opportunity to explore
settings where prices are presented in calendar form and not just revealed when dates
are entered. Interestingly, we find that floor prices tend to correlate positively with
occupancy rates and booking probability in this setting. While we do not have enough
evidence to make a strong causal claim with this data, we provide it as a puzzle that
can hopefully stimulate researchers to investigate it further in the future.
“From” prices on Airbnb.com are calculated based on the minimum price that
appears on the calendar of a listing over the next 30 days. We examine how this
minimum price affects bookings. We collect listing-level calendar data on Airbnb
(scraped weekly for 2 months in 2015), with each scrape being associated with a
minimum price. We have detailed information on roughly 23,000 listings in the greater
Boston and New York area, and static as well as dynamic characteristics (location,
size and number of rooms being offered, accommodation type, prices, and ratings).
In total, we have 91,268 unique listing-scrape combinations. The identifying variation
comes from scrape-to-scrape changes in the floor price for a given listing. Although we
cannot observe consumer-level variables for this analysis, this setting allows us to look
at the effect of floor prices on the occupancy rate of hotels, since we have access to the
entire calendar. As mentioned before, we also know the price associated with every
date on the calendar (price information appears next to the calendar date, and was
also visible to consumers at the time the data was collected). So, this setting allows
us to model the difference between focal and floor prices for every date, and examine
how this gap affects bookings. Our observational results indicate that, a larger floor
price, as well as a smaller relative difference between the displayed From price and
the actual price paid, leads to both greater booking probability and higher occupancy
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rates, while controlling for focal prices and various time-invariant fixed effects, as well
as different functional forms. To further alleviate concerns of endogeneity, we estimate
an additional specification that compares listings with a positive change in From price
over the 2 month observation period and those with no change. The listings that see
a change of greater than $5 are labeled as “treatment” listings, and matched with
control listings based on a set of listing level characteristics (we use robust Lasso
(Chernozhukov et al., 2016) to control for selection on observables). We find that
treatment listings have a higher occupancy rate relative to control.
We start with a descriptive plot that examines mean booking probability as a
function of the wedge (difference between focal price and minimum (floor) price).
First, we bin the wedge in bins of 10. Then, we calculate the percentage of booked
nights within each bin. Finally, we create a plot of this percentage against the bins.
We see a declining trend as the difference is larger (Figure B·5).
B.3.1 Within listings
First, our goal is to estimate the impact of the floor price, over and above the
focal price and other listing and time level characteristics. To do so, we make use of
three key independent variables :
1. the “Starting from...’ price associated with a given listing-calendar date
(PriceF rom)
2. the absolute difference (Diff) between the focal and the “Starting from...” price
and,
3. the relative difference (Frac.Diff = Diff
P rice
) between the focal and the “Starting
from...” price.
In our first set of regressions, our dependent variable of interest in an binary
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Figure B·5: Effect of the wedge difference in Prices and floor prices
on booking probability. First, differences are binned in groups of 10.
Then, for each bin, the average booking probability is computed. We
see that the probability decreases as the difference increases. The bars
indicate 95% confidence intervals, and the fitted line and shaded region
plots out smoothed conditional means.
indicator for whether a listing i has a booked night j at time t. The unit of analysis
is thus at the listing-scrape-calendar date level. The equations estimated are:
Bookingijt = β1PriceF romit +β2Priceijt +αi + δt + ǫijt
Bookingijt = β1Diffijt +β2Priceijt +αi + δt + ǫijt
Bookingijt = β1Frac.Diffijt +β2Priceijt +αi + δt + ǫijt
(B.6)
We include fixed effects for listing, month of scrape and month of calendar, to ac-
count for time invariant characteristics and transient time shocks respectively. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the listing level. The results are reported in Table B.1.
We see that larger From price, as well as a smaller relative difference between the
displayed From price and the actual price paid, leads to greater booking probability.
Column (1) uses Price and PriceF rom as independent variables; column (2) looks at
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their difference relative to Price and column (3) looks at their absolute difference.
Table B.1: A larger From price, as well as a smaller relative difference
between the displayed From price and the actual price paid, leads to
greater booking probability. The unit of analysis is a listing-scrape-
calendar day. Column (1) uses Price and PriceF rom as independent
variables; column (2) looks at their difference relative to Price and












Price - PriceF rom −0.00003
(0.00001)∗∗
p = 0.029
Price −0.00001 0.00002 0.00001
(0.00001)∗ (0.00001)∗∗ (0.00001)
p = 0.097 p = 0.036 p = 0.252
Listing Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Travel month Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Scrape month Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,967,778 18,967,778 18,967,778
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.152 0.152
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Next, instead of looking at booking probabilities, we look at the occupancy rate
(defined as the fraction of booked nights out of all available nights). The unit of anal-
ysis here is aggregated at the listing-scrape level. Hence, for every listing i and every
scrape instance t, we take averages of the variables of interest over the entire calen-
dar. Hence, for every listing-scrape, we look at average of Price, Diff and Frac.Diff
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(PriceF rom is already at the listing-scrape level and can thus enter as is):
OccupancyRateit = β1PriceF romit +β2Priceit +αi + δt + ǫit
OccupancyRateit = β1Diffit +β2Priceit +αi + δt + ǫit
OccupancyRateit = β1Frac.Diffit +β2Priceit +αi + δt + ǫit
(B.7)
The results are reported in Table B.2. Again, we see that a larger From price, as
well as a smaller relative difference between the displayed From price and the actual
price paid, leads to higher occupancy rate. Column (1) uses Price and PriceF rom as
independent variables; column (2) looks at their mean absolute difference (by scrape),
and column (3) looks at their mean difference relative to Price (by scrape).
A possible concern with the above specifications might be the high correlation
between prices and “Starting from...” prices. We follow Jindal (2018) in designing
our key specifications - however, as with any specification that control for focal prices
while also modeling the gap between price and reference prices, multicollinearity
might be an issue. However, it is to be noted that this would inflate our standard
errors, and thus make it harder to find significant effects. Hence, finding significance
in this setting is eventually a more stringent test of our hypotheses.
Further, we are concerned about the endogeneity of prices. Given we are modeling
demand as a function of prices, there is a risk of simultaneity/omitted variables that
biases the price coefficient. This might partially explain the lack of significance of
the price coefficient. The key omitted variable in our setting is likely to be some
measure of absolute quality - quality would be positively correlated with price, and
with demand, which would lead to our observed effects. Unfortunately, we cannot
control for quality using a rating metric, due to the short time series of scrapes.
Ratings on Airbnb are inflated overall, and there is hardly any variation in star
ratings over a 2 month period.
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Table B.2: A larger From price, as well as a smaller relative differ-
ence between the displayed From price and the actual price paid, leads
to higher occupancy rate (calculated as the fraction of total available




Price −0.0002 0.00000 −0.00000
(0.00004)∗∗∗ (0.00002) (0.00002)




Price - PriceF rom −0.0002
(0.00003)∗∗∗
p = 0.00000





Listing Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Scrape month Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Observations 89,491 89,491 89,491
Adjusted R2 0.147 0.147 0.148
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Finally, another concern is related to the effect sizes. The means of our two
dependent variables (booking probability and occupancy rate) as 0.02 and 0.036 re-
spectively. Hence, our effect sizes are < 1%. However, it is to be noted that, given we
make use of observational variation within listings, the changes are fairly small (the
mean value of standard deviation for “Starting from...” prices within listing is $5).
This suggests that an average change of as little as $5 in the From price can affect
booking outcomes, which highlights that the results are economically significant.
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B.3.2 Across listings
Given the above limitations, we now report results from an across-listing identi-
fication strategy. We pick listings that experience a large change in From prices ($5
and more) as the “treated” listings. To ensure comparability between treated and
control listings, we add covariates for (1) neighborhood, (2) number of beds, (3) bed
type, (4) city, (5) whether instant bookable, (6) price for an extra person, (6) number
of reviews, (7) number of pictures and (8) person capacity. We could not use star
rating as a control because Airbnb only releases ratings once listings get more than 3
reviews (which most listings in our sample do not). However, conditional on the above
covariates, the mean price across treatment and control listings are not significantly
different. Thus, we can argue that we are capturing underlying listing quality with
these variables. The results are reported in Table B.3 - column (1) has no controls
and column (2) implements variable selection using RLasso3 (Chernozhukov et al.,
2016). Again, we find that treated listings (which experience an increase in From
price) have a higher occupancy rate relative to control.
Thus, we find evidence that “From” price levels are positively correlated with
booking probability and occupancy rates at the listing level.
3This approach allows us to obtain valid confidence bounds on a causal/target parameter while
flexibly controlling for “nuisance” paramaters (in our case, listing coviariates)
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Table B.3: Occupancy rate for “treated” listings with a positive change






p = 0.003 p = 0.058
Listing level covariates No Yes -rlasso
Observations 20,396 20,396
Adjusted R2 0.0004 0.009
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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